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ABSTRACT
Through a new use of "objective self-awareness" techniques, 
this study investigates the relationship between empathic under­
standing of others and various aspects of the understanding of 
the self. Several theorists have suggested that the formation 
of concepts about the self is in part dependent upon understand­
ing the feelings, beliefs, and evaluations from others. Accu­
rate empathy not only suggests greater understanding of feed­
back from others, but also an ability to take the role and per­
spective of another outside the distorting influences of one's 
own subjective motives and defenses. The present study tests 
whether persons with greater empathy and understanding of 
others reveal more integrated, positive, and stable self con­
cepts and more characteristic self-awareness.
In the first experiment high-empathy and low-empathy males 
and females were tested in two sessions designed to externally 
evoke either low or high self-awareness. As hypothesized, the 
externally-induced objective self-awareness (OSA) resulted in 
a greater shift in real and social self-descriptions for low- 
empathy than high-empathy persons. The direction of this shift 
was toward descriptions significantly less positive than descrip­
tions without the OSA manipulation and descriptions given by 
high-empathy subjects in either OSA condition. Empathy ratings 
and self-descriptions were further validated against evaluations 
of subjects by their peers.
The second experiment tested matched subjects across two 
sessions of the same OSA condition. Similar within-condition 
effects were noted as in Experiment 1, but subjects shifted 
less across sessions (time)., and were less differentiated in 
shifting due to empathy. This suggests that the effects of 
the first experiment were indeed due to greater changes in 
objective self-awareness for low-empathy subjects than for 
high-empathy subjects.
The results suggest that high-empathy subjects are more 
characteristically self-aware regardless of external OSA 
manipulations. Exploratory measures showed empathy to be 
correlated with private self-consciousness, moderately-high 
self-esteem, and ratings from peers. In addition, the results 
indicate that this new technique of objective self-awareness 
may prove valuable in future studies of individual differences.
INTRODUCTION
Various explanations of the etiology of self-concept 
and self-esteem have been attempted. Among these are those 
which suggest that self-concept is closely linked to social 
interactions. Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) state that the 
ability to take the role of another person is crucially re­
lated to the self-concept. A person imagines or perceives 
how his/her behavior, feelings and motives appear to others 
and how these are evaluated. Subsequently, feelings and 
concepts about the self emerge from what one believes to be 
the evaluations made by others.
Sullivan (1953) believes that the self-concept develops 
through interpersonal relations and an individual’s concern 
about how other people will react to him/her. Rewarding or 
positive relationships will lead to more positive self- 
concepts while unrewarding or negative relationships will 
lead to more negative self-concepts.
In developing a self-concept, an individual makes cer­
tain self-attributions and judgements. Since there are often 
no objective bases for the self-evaluations implied by this 
process, Festinger (1954) claims that o n e ’s need for such 
an evaluation can be fulfilled by "social comparison" with 
other people. He suggests two motives for social comparison 
in self-evaluation. The first is a "drive to evaluate his 
opinions and abilities" so that his cognitions achieve
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congruence with reality. The second involves "a u n i ­
directional drive u p w a r d s ” to achieve a more favorable self 
evaluation and self-protection from unfavorable evaluations 
Latane (1966) refers to these as "self-evaluation" and 
"self-enhancement", respectively, and cites research evi­
dence supporting these two distinct motivational goals.
Of particular theoretical importance is the evidence 
found for self-enhancement (Friend & Gilbert, 1973; Wheeler 
et al., 1969). With greater self-enhancement motivation, a 
more restricted or less competent comparison group may be 
chosen (Wheeler, et al., 1969). Similarly, a greater need 
for self-enhancement may motivate greater inaccuracy and 
distortion of a p e r s o n ’s perceptions of o t h e r s ’ c o g n i ­
tions, emotions, and evaluations (Festinger, 1964). The 
need for self-enhancement may also restrict the frequency 
of comparisons (and concomitant self-awareness) if the re­
sult is likely to be unfavorable, thus invoking self-pro­
tective defenses.
If either the frequency or accuracy of social r e ­
flections or comparisons is low, the possibility of d i s ­
crepancy between self-evaluations and evaluations made by 
others is greater. If the chosen reference group is more 
restricted, a greater likelihood of discrepancy exists b e t ­
ween the evaluations made by the self and a larger number 
of others outside the reference group.
O n e ’s level of self-esteem has been found to directly 
influence o n e ’s self-enhancement needs. As described by
William James (1892), self-esteem (positive self-concept) 
is the degree to which one's actual successes coincide with 
one's pretensions (i.e., goals and aspirations). Among the 
most accepted translation of this concept is the measure of 
discrepancy between the real self and ideal self on such 
scales as that developed by Bills, Vance & McLean (1951):
In this measure self esteem, subjects are asked: (a) how
often each of fifty traits are characteristic of him or her 
real self, (b) how often lie/she would like each to be so 
(ideal self), and (c) how important he/she feels each trait 
is to possess. In cases requiring direct subject reports, 
the measure of real self is the subject's self-evaluation 
on each item. As previously discussed, this is not neces­
sarily consistent with either the actual behaviour or others 
evaluations of the person. In forming the real self-con­
cept, self-enhancing needs are limited by the need for con­
gruence with reality; on the other hand, the need for one's 
self concept to coincide with one's aspirations may be 
threatened by greater awareness of one's true situation, i.e 
the gap between the real self and the ideal self.
According to Mead (1934) and Rogers (1959), the ability 
to accurately perceive and evaluate oneself is dependent 
upon the degree to which one can take the role of another 
in viewing the self objectively. This ability to take a 
viewpoint that is relatively undistorted by one's own sub­
jective motives and defenses is also described as essential 
to the achievement of empathic understanding (Rogers,1959) .
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Empathy has been defined as one's ability to u nder­
stand the private experience of another as if it were one's 
own, and to extend oneself to communicate this understanding 
(Gruax & Carkhuff, 1967; Watson, 1976). If empathy enables 
a person to accurately perceive the feelings and beliefs of 
others (Rogers, 1959), then it is likely that it also e n ­
ables one to more accurately perceive others' feelings and 
beliefs about oneself.
This is, of course, most likely if a person is able to 
understand others' reactions and evaluations about him/her 
without distortions motivated by self-enhancement or self­
protection. If this awareness of others' evaluations affects 
the self-concept, then it is expected that the person's a c ­
curate awareness will promote a self-concept more consistent 
with the concept of him/her held by others (Mead, 1934; 
Sullivan, 1953). Mead (1934) further states that a well- 
adjusted, socially-effective individual possesses the ability 
to respond abstractly to himself/herself as an object and 
will experience greater consistency among his "selves" (i.e., 
self-concept, actual self, and socially-perceived selves). 
Rogers (1959) and Fitts (1971) believe that such consistency 
is related to one's self-esteem and freedom from maladaptive 
b e h a v i o r .
The primary hypothesis the present study proposes to 
test is that persons with high empathy characteristically 
observe themselves more often from the viewpoint of an "other", 
beyond the dominance of subjective defenses or self-enhancing
distortions. Therefore, high-empathy subjects will show 
less of a shift in self-concept than low-empathy subjects 
when tested in both a control situation and a situation 
eliciting high awareness of the self as an object.
Empathy
Research findings and correlations of empathy differ 
somewhat with the various definitions of empathy employed. 
Empathy has been defined as cognitive role-taking ability 
(Dymond, 1949), as "the ability to experience another p e r ­
son's emotional state" (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Stotland, 
1969), and "a charitable, altruistic form of love for a- 
nother individual as another unique human being (involving) 
compassion, appreciation, and tolerance" (Shostrom, 1972).
Hogan (1975) utilizes a role-theoretical model and 
items empirically derived from MMPI and CPI item Q-sorts to 
arrive at a definition including role-taking ability, toler­
ance, considerateness, social self-confidence, and "human­
istic values." He found empathy to be highly correlated 
with MMPI measures of maladjustment, social introversion, 
anxiety, and depression.
Rogers (1959) defines empathy as the accurate per­
ception of the internal frame of reference, emotions and 
meanings of another as if one were the other. More recently, 
the communication of this empathic understanding to the 
other has been viewed as essential to the total experience 
of empathy (Carkhuff & Berenson, 1967; Truax & Carkhuff, 1967 
Rogers, 1975; Watson, 1976).
Empathy is conceptually defined in the present study 
as the ability to accurately perceive and understand the 
inner experiences of another person (affective-sensitivity), 
and the extension of the self to communicate that under­
standing to the other. These two integral components may 
be regarded, respectively, as the intrapsychic and the inter­
personal levels of empathy (Watson, 1976). For true em­
pathy, the intrapsychic may be viewed as a prerequisite for 
the interpersonal.
To Rogers (1959), empathy is a way of knowing and under­
standing which can be directed either toward understanding 
of others, or understanding of the self (Shlien, 1962). This 
implies a relationship between empathy and self-concept.
Part of one's entire perceptual field becomes differentiated 
as the self-concept. The dimensions of self-concept have 
values. An experience is first related to the self-con­
cept and is then either:
(1) symbolized accurately, perceived consciously and 
organized into the self- structure.
(2) ignored, though sensed, because it has no signi­
ficance to the self, or
(3) denied or distorted when symbolized because it is 
threatening to the self. (Hart & Tomlinsen, 1970)
Such "threat," (e.g., threat t o ’positive self-view) 
narrows and rigidifies perception and arouses defenses 
against the painful awareness of incongruence between one's 
experience and o n e ’s self-concept. At this point either 
denied experience becomes strong enough to evoke defense 
against self-awareness, or else the self-concept is altered
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to include the experience at the expense of "confidence." 
Defenses can be lowered and greater congruence between self- 
concept and experience achieved if unconditional positive 
regard is increased in the context of empathic understanding -- 
either by the self or by a significant other.
This account of the interrelation of positive self-con­
cept and empathy is very similar to the accounts suggested 
by the social comparison theorists previously discussed. The 
need for "congruence" functions much like the motive toward 
self-evaluation and the need for positive self-concept acts 
much like the motive toward self-enhancement. The "defenses" 
of Rogers' theory correspond roughly to the motivated distor­
tion and denial, decrease in social self-comparisons, and 
limited choice of reference group of the social theorists.
Both theoretical viewpoints would pr ed ic t that increasing 
the awareness of the self as an object (in defensive and low- 
empathy people) would result in a reported self-concept p r o ­
portionately less effected by self-enhancing defenses and 
more congruent with one's experiences and the evaluations 
of social others. However, those persons who are less res­
tricted by defenses and highly empathic would more likely be 
more consistently self-aware. Therefore experimental attempts 
to increase self-awareness in these persons who are already 
self-aware wouId be redundant.
Objective Self-Awareness
An experimental method of inducing a state of heightened 
self-focused attention has been developed from the recent
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theory of "objective self-awareness" (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
By placing a subject in front of mirrors and removing other 
distracting or unnecessary stimuli, the subject's attention 
was directed more toward the self as an object than toward 
the environment.
According to Duval and W i c k l u n d 's theory, a person's 
attention is directed either toward the self or toward the 
environment. The former condition, referred to as "object­
ive self-awareness" could be increased or decreased by in­
ducing an incremental change in the proportion of time spent 
in self-focused attention.
By increasing a person's objective self-awareness, his/ 
her attention becomes drawn to discrepancies between the 
levels of actual attainment (abilities and characteristics) 
of the self and the level of aspiration for that salient 
d imens ion. These 1evels correspond roughly to the real self 
and id eal s e l f .
Objective self-awareness theory proposes that "attention 
focused on intraself discrepancy would result in negative 
affect in proportion to the size of the (negative) discrep­
ancy," (Wicklund, 1974). Assuming that a motivation such 
as F e s t i n g e r 's (1954) "unidirectional drive upward" exists, 
one's private aspirations would be maintained at a higher 
level than actual attainment. However, upon a dimension not 
highly valued or not salient, either relatively no discrep­
ancy or no negative affect may be generated. It is this
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negative affect, similar to Rogers (1959) "painful awareness 
of incongruence", that provides the motivation for either re­
ducing the discrepancy or reducing the level of objective 
self-awareness of it (Festinger, 1964; Zanna, Higgins & Taves, 
1976). Consistent with Rogers theory and social comparison
theory, the discrepancy can be reduced by (a) raising the 
evaluation of the real self (by self enhancement), or (b) 
lowering the level of aspiration (ideal self), (c) distorting 
or denying aspects of one's self-experience, or (d) direct­
ing attention away to either another self-dimension or to the 
environment (avoidance of the self-focusing stimulus and 
state). Increased objective self-awareness increases one's 
awareness of these discrepancies while decreasing options (c) 
and (d).
Research has stimulated one revision of the theory: re­
cent and potent success experience may exceed one's aspira­
tions creating a salient positive discrepancy resulting in 
positive affect (Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973). Under all 
other conditions, the most consistent research finding has 
been that experimentally heightened objective self-awareness 
results in more critical self-evaluations and reduced self­
esteem. This is usually due to a significant decrease in 
real-self ratings while ideal-self ratings are relatively 
unaffected (Wicklund, 1974; Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973). 
This supports the theory that heightened objective self- 
awareness should induce greater admission of real-ideal dis­
crepancies, thus reducing the effectiveness of self-enhance-
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ment and distorting defenses. When distrating stimuli draw 
an individual's attention away from the subject, opposite 
results were obtained, i.e. less awareness and admission of 
discrepancies (Wicklund, 1975). Parallel effects were ob ­
served in assigning attributions of responsibility under con­
ditions of either objective self-awareness or distraction.
One further problem is that of avoiding objective self- 
awareness. It has been demonstrated that if discrepancy is 
high (unfavorable feedback), subjects will tend to physically 
avoid self-focusing stimuli if allowed the opportunity (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972). It has also been shown that subjects under 
the objective self-awareness condition will perform more self- 
distracting motor movement such as hand gesturing (Dittmore 
& Llewellyn, 1969) or smoking (Liebling, Seiler & Shaver,
1974).
Previous research indicates that experimentally-indueed 
objective self-awareness is a useful tool in measuring the 
positive self-concept, or self-esteem. Ickes, et al. (1973) 
showed that subjects whose attention was self-focused by lis­
tening to their own tape-recorded voice reported lower self­
esteem than subjects who heard a n o t h e r ’s voice. They also 
showed that self-focused attention lowered self-esteem given 
negative feedback on a fictitious personality trait and raised 
esteem given positive feedback. In short, self-esteem is more 
likely to vary under differing conditions with objective self- 
awareness. Except when positive feedback or a recent, potent 
success is present, reports of self-esteem, or positive self- 
concept, will decline with objective self-awareness.
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Major problems exist in using self-report measures to 
predict or account for behavior. Mischel (1969) discusses 
a number of these. Theories and studies of person percep­
tion, impression formation and self-concept illustrate not 
only the continuity and consistency of human cognitive con­
structions but also their resistance to change and experien­
tial influences. This is highlighted by the theories of in­
congruity, dissonance, motivational distortion defense m e c h a ­
nisms. Self-report measures often show questionable validity 
as revealed by low correlations between tests and the o b ­
served behavior they claim to measure or predict. It has 
been empirically demonstrated that objective self-awareness 
techniques can raise the validity of a face-valid self-report 
measure of sociability (Pryor, Gibbons & Wicklund, 1973).
There is recent evidence supporting the notion of indi­
vidual differences in the ability and tendency to engage 
spontaneously in objective self-awareness (Fenigstein, Scheier, 
& Buss, 1975; Carver and Glass, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977).
A Self-Consciousness Scale has been constructed by Fenigstein, 
et a l .(197 5) to measure this tendency. Analysis of the scale 
revealed three factors: private self - consciousness, public
consciousness and social anxiety. Private self-consciousness 
refers to a greater personal awareness of one's thoughts and 
feelings and a tendency to be self-reflective and introspect- 
ive. Public self-consciousness refers to awareness of the 
self as a social object with concern about one's social ap ­
pearance and the impressions made on others. Social anxiety 
refers to the anxiwty that may or may not follow from public
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self-consciousness and any resulting evaluation or apprehen­
sion. These three factors are only weakly intercorrelated. 
Private self-consciousness also shows no correlation with 
measures of general emotionality, test anxiety, sociability, 
activity level, or impulsivity (Carver & Glass, 1976; 
Fenigstein, et al., 1975; Scheier & Carver, 1977).
Separate experiments have demonstrated that increased 
responsivity to affect is found in both subjects with high 
private self-consciousness and subjects exposed to a mirror, 
i.e. high objective self-awareness (Scheier & Carver, 1975). 
Moreover increased salience of absence of affect was found 
in both subjects exposed to a mirror and subjects high in 
private self-consciousness. When misinformed about the ef­
fects of a placebo, these subjects reported a lower incidence 
of the suggested symptoms than those not exposed to a mirror 
or low in private self-consciousness (Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, 
& Hormuth, 1979).
In both of the above mentioned studies, subjects were 
redivided into high and low public self-consciousness groups.
No main effects or interaction effects were found by re ­
dividing according to levels of social anxiety. The mirror 
and private self-consciousness yield the same findings in in­
creasing self-focused projective responses, attributions to 
the self, and enhancing the validity of self-reports (Scheier 
& Carver, 1977). The overall implication is that not only are 
these situational determinants of objective self-awareness, 
but also representative of individual differences in disposi-
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tional tendencies toward objective self-awareness.
Objective self-awareness induces greater perception of 
incongruities among real self-concept, ideal self-concept, 
intersubjective reality (peer judgments), o n e ’s concept of 
peer judgments (social self - concept), and o n e ’s actual be­
havior. This clearer perception-awareness has been shown to 
motivate discrepancy-reduction between the real and ideal 
selves (Wicklund, 1974), between the real self and behavior 
(Carver, 1974; Scheier, 1976), and the ideal self and be ­
havior (Carver, 1975; Scheier, Fenigstein & Buss, 1974).
Thus it is possible that those persons who ordinarily 
and more frequently experience objective self-awareness have 
both a clearer view of these discrepancies and are more often 
motivated to reduce these discrepancies. Such persons are 
likely to achieve greater intraself integration and inter­
personal understanding.
The present study is designed to investigate Rogers view, 
also implied by social comparison theorists, that the ability 
and tendency of a person to take a perspective outside his 
subjective self can lead to a-more accurate understanding of 
both himself and others. This ability to take an objective 
perspective is herein identified most closely with the ability 
and tendency of one to engage spontaneously in a state of ob­
jective self-awareness without it being externally elicited.
The ability to understand others more accurately and the 
tendency to engage in this understanding and reduction of dis­
crepancies in understanding are implied in the measuring of
empathy. Therefore, if the above conceptual reasoning is 
valid, then subjects who demonstrate greater empathy are 
more likely to ordinarily experience objective self-aware­
ness more often than low-empathy subjects. This is more 
likely to result in a more integrated self-concept that is 
less distorted and less restricted by defenses or incongrui­
ties. Moreover, high-empathy persons would be more likely 
to experience high self-awareness even in the low self-aware­
ness condition, thereby experiencing less of a difference bet­
ween high and low experimental (OSA) conditions during self- 
evaluation than low-empathy subjects.
EXPERIMENT I
In this study the subjects were first grouped according 
to high and low empathy scores from the Affective Sensitivity 
Scale (intrapsychic component) and Hogan's CPI Empathy Scale 
(interpersonal component). Each subject then recorded his/ 
her real self-concept, ideal concept, and social self-con­
cept under conditions of both high and low objective self- 
awareness (OSA). Half of each group received the high OSA 
condition in the first session, half in the second. Four peer 
descriptions were obtained for each subject. The following 
experimental hypotheses were tested:
I. In the high-OSA condition, high-empathy subjects will 
report more positive Real-Self and Social-Self Evalua­
tions than low-empathy subjects.
II. (a) High-empathy subjects will show less of a shift than
low-empathy subjects in Real-Self descriptions across
OSA conditions (e.g. mirror to no mirror).
(b) The direction of shift for low-empathy subjects will 
be toward more positive self-descriptions in the low-OSA 
than the high-OSA condition.
III. (a) High-empathy subjects will show less of a shift than 
low-empathy subjects in Social-Self descriptions across 
OSA conditions.
(b) The direction of shift for low-empathy subjects will 
be toward more positive descriptions in the low-OSA condi­
tion than in the high-OSA condition.
IV. (a) High-empathy subjects will show less of a shift than
low-empathy subjects in reported self-esteem (Real/Ideal 
discrepancies) across OSA conditions.
(b) The direction of shift for low-empathy subjects will 
be toward less self-esteem (i.e. greater Real/Ideal d i s ­
crepancies) in the high-OSA condition.
16.
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V. (a) High-empathy subjects will show less of a shift
than low-empathy subjects in reported Social-Ideal Self 
discrepancies across OSA conditions.
(b) Low-empathy subjects will shift more than high- 
empathy subjects in the direction of greater Social- 
Ideal discrepancy in the high-OSA condition.
VI. (a) In the low-OSA condition, high-empathy subjects 
will show greater correspondence between Social-Self 
and Peer Descriptions than low-empathy subjects.
VII. In the low-OSA condition high-empathy subjects should
achieve higher correspondence between the R e a 1 Self and
Peer Descriptions than low-empathy subjects.
In addition several exploratory questions are asked:
1. In the low-OSA condition will high-empathy subjects 
show higher consistency than low-empathy subjects between:
(a) Real and Social self-descriptions?
(b) Real self-descriptions and Peer Descriptions?
2. Will low-empathy subjects show higher consistency
or correlation in the high-OSA than the low-OSA condition 
b e twe e n :
(a) Real and Social self-descriptions?
(b) Real self-descriptions and Peer Descriptions?
3. In the high-OSA condition, will high-empathy subjects 
show higher real/ideal self congruance than low-empathy 
subj ec t s ?
4. What are the respective levels of social desirability 
among real self, ideal self, social self and peer des­
cript ion for:
(a) high-empathy subjects in low-OSA condition.
(b) high-empathy subjects in high-OSA condition
(c) low-empathy subjects in low-OSA condition.
(d) low-empathy subjects in high-OSA condition.
5. What configuration is suggested by the intercorrela­
tions among real self, ideal self, social self, and peer 
descriptions ?
6. How does repression-sensitization level interact with 
empathy and self-esteem?
7. To what extent do empathy and the factors of the Self- 
Consciousness Scale correlate?
Method
Subj ec t s
Forty-eight females and 45 males volunteered from six 
college sororities, four college fraternities, and two resi­
dential living units. Two females and four males failed to 
complete all three sessions and were dropped from the data 
analyses, leaving a total of 87 subjects. Subjects were paid 
$3.00 each for their participation in the study.
Apparatu s
One large mirror, 2 feet by 3 feet in size, was used as 
an objective self-awareness stimulus. It was placed against 
the wall directly in front of the subjects’ table. Except 
for the mirror, a table, a chair, pencils and test forms, the 
room was empty of as many distracting stimuli as possible.
In the low self-awareness condition, the distracting stimulus 
of an art-reproduction poster replaced the mirror.
Measures
Empathy was measured with three instruments. The Affect­
ive Sensitivity Scale (Campbell, Kagan and Krathwohl, 1971) 
was used to measure the intra-psychic component of empathy. 
This scale was constructed as a measure of the ability to 
accurately perceive the inner experience of another person. 
Videotapes of actual counseling interviews include six female 
and four male clients in one to five scenes each. A very di­
verse range of experiences are presented to test breadth of 
empathic understanding. Videotaped excerpts are followed by
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multiple-choice questionnaire from which the viewer is asked 
to select the statement that best describes the clients feel­
ings during the last part of the excerpt. The correct state­
ment for each excerpt is an actual statement from the client 
about how he/she felt during the last part of the interview. 
Using the interpersonal Recall Procedure (Kagan, Krathwohl,
& Miller, 1963; Kagan, et a l . , 1967), the first counselor
was replaced by a new counselor who viewed the videotape with 
the client and then asked the client about his/her feelings 
during the interview.
Construct validity showed significant relationships bet­
ween the scores on the Affective Sensitivity Scale and rankings 
by group therapists of group m e m b e r ’s affective sensitivity, 
rankings by supervisors of doctoral stud e n t s ’ counseling ef­
fectiveness, and peer ratings of counselor effectiveness. 
Test-retest reliability of the scale is r = 0.75 over a one 
week period (Campbell, et al., 1971).
The empathy Scale of the California Personality Inventory 
(CPI) was developed by Hogan (1969). Composite Q-sort d e s ­
criptions of the "ideally empathic person" were provided by 
seven staff psychologists at the institute of Personality 
Assessment and Research at U.C. Berkley and were intercor­
related yielding a coefficient .59 to .78, mean .71 and es­
timated reliability of .94. Using this empathy composite 
Q-sort, 211 subjects were rated and high and low sub-groups 
formed. Subj e c t s ’ responses to the combined MMPI-CPI item
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pool were compared against this criteria and 64 items were 
retained. The average correlation between the 64-item scale 
responses and the composite Q-sort ratings was .62. Test- 
retest reliability over a two-month interval was estimated 
at .84 (Hogan, 1969). "The scale routinely yields correla­
tions above .4 with rated empathy, rated social acuity, and 
skill at playing charades" (Hogan, 1975).
The empathy Scale has shown correlations of ,60 with 
communicative skill and with likability and correlations of 
-.53, -.41, and -.41 with social introversion, anxiety, and 
depression, respectively (Hogan, 1975). This scale seems to 
be particularly sensitive to the interpersonal communication 
of empathy.
The Peer Rating of Empathy uses peer judgements to sug­
gest how empathic a person behaves in his relations with 
others. It was adapted from the Empathy Scale of the Barrett- 
Lennard Relationship Inventory (Barrett-Lennard, 1962) to
measure "empathy at the interpersonal level of extension of 
self in communication of understanding" (Watson, 1976). The 
Barrett-Lennard Empathy Scale has demonstrated merit as a 
predictor of successful outcome in psychotherapy (Barrett- 
Lennard, 1962; Kurtz & Grummon, 1972). It has shown a split- 
half reliability of 0.86 to 0.96 and a test-retest reliability 
of 0.91 (Barrett-Lennard & Jewell, 1966). The Peer Rating 
questionnaire was originally constructed by Watson (1976) by 
adapting 10 statement items from the Barrett-Lennard measure 
and two new ones, and demonstrating internal consistency on
11 of the 12 times. For this study the Peer Rating of Empathy 
was expanded to include a total of 36 statements, 32 adopted 
from the Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory plus 4 new 
statements. As in W a t s o n ’s measure these items are descrip­
tive of empathy or lack of empathy along the dimensions of 
"empathic communication of understanding". (10 items) An 
equal number of statements are keyed to a positive response 
as to a negative response within each of the three dimensions. 
The order of dimensions represented on the questionnaire is 
random with positive and negative-keyed responses alternating 
to avoid a response set. Responses to each question are on 
a 7-point scale from "never or almost never" to "always or 
almost always."
Self-concept is operationally defined and measured in 
terms of the Adjective Description Scale (ADS) constructed 
by Veldman and Parker (1970). This scale was developed through 
factor analysis of 5,017 college freshman responses to the 
300-item Adjective Check List (Gough, 1960; Gough & Heilbrun, 
1965). The eight highest loading items on seven new factors 
were retained, alphabetized, and presented with 5-point scales 
to 713 females in teacher training (Veldman & Parker, 1970). 
Factor analysis replicated the original structure and simple 
scales used showed higher internal consistency (.77 to .97) 
and higher test-retest reliability (.80 to .92) than the ACL 
scales (Parker & Veldman, 1969; Veldman & Parker, 1970). 
Evidence for good discriminative and concurrent validity 
against another measure, the Self-Report Inventory (Brown &
22.
Richels, 19 67), was obtained.
The advantages of the ADS over the ACL also include the 
brevity of administration (5 minutes) and the 5-point scale 
ratings. These scale ratings contribute to the information 
received and preciseness (Anastasi, 1961) and are preferred 
by subjects over dichotomous-choice tests (Spitzer, Stratton, 
Fitzgerald & Mach, 1966). Moreover, the results of these 
five-point ratings have been translated into yes-no ratings 
which are almost identical to the actual yes-no ratings ob­
tained from subjects on both the ADS and ACL. This also 
allows greater control for response-acquiescenee or criteria 
dif f e r e n c e s .
The versatility inherent in such a face-valid, straight­
forward measure allows one to ask subjects to check items that 
are (1 ) descriptive of the self (real self-concept), (2) des­
criptive of how they would like to be (ideal self-concept),
(3) descriptive of how most others perceive them to be (so­
cial self), or (4) descriptive of another person (peer d e s ­
cription). A composite description was derived from three 
peer descriptions of the same person.
Exploratory Measures
The Self Consciousness Scale of Fenigstein et a l ., (1975)
was administered to all subjects. This measure and its con­
current and discriminant validity were previously discussed 
on pages 12-^13 - Test-retest correlations over a two week 
interval are .84, .79, and .73 for the public self-conscious­
ness, respectively and .80 for the total score (Fenigstein
23.
et al., 1975). "The convergence between mirror-manipulated 
self-awareness and private self-consciousness was offered as 
support for an attentional interpretation of the findings 
(objective self-awareness)" (Scheier & Carver, 1977). Neither 
individual differences in the effect of self-awareness m a n i ­
pulations upon subjects, nor the relation of these differences 
to the Self Consciousness Scale have been directly explored 
within the same experiment.
Inclusion of this measure in the present study should 
yield information regarding the relationship of each factor 
to empathy and their interactions with OSA manipulations.
Rosenberg's four-point Self Esteem Scale (1965), the 
RSE, is a widely used and cited instrument measuring "global 
self regard" (Wylie, 1974). A two-week test-retest reliability 
coefficient of .85 has been obtained as well as convergent 
validity against three other measures of self-esteem: the
Kelly Reperatory Test (_r=.67), the Health Self-Image Question­
naire (_r=.83) and interviewers' ratings of self-esteem (_r =
.56) (Silber & Trippett, 1965). The measure will be used to 
establish convergent validity with the study's measure of 
self-esteem.
Byrne's Repression-Sensitization Scale (1961; 1964) has 
been suggested as relevant to the idea of self-acceptance.
This is "compatible with Cohen's (1959) characterization of 
self-esteem as a defensive mode or defensive style..." (Wells 
& Marwell, 1976). This is particularly relevant to the re­
lationship drawn between empathy, self-awareness and cogni­
tive defenses.
24.
Procedure
Subjects were tested in groups of 3 or 4 upon the E m ­
pathy Scale form the CPI and the Affective-Sensitivity Scale 
counterbalanced for order of administration. Subjects were 
divided into two groups with a median split on the Composite 
Empathy scores. Composite Empathy scores were derived by 
double-weighing the z-scores on the Affective-Sensitivity 
measure and adding them to the z-scores on the Hogan Empathy 
measure plus a constant. Using a median split, the highest 
scorers were defined as the High-Empathy Group; the lowest 
composite scores determined the low-Empathy Group. There 
were no effects due to order of scale administration. Follow­
ing the empathy measures, the supplementary measures were 
administered in counter balanced order: the Self-Conscious­
ness Scale, R o s e n b e r g ’s RSE and Bryne's Repression-Sensiti- 
zation Scale. Only the Repression-Sensitization Scale showed 
any order effects; scores were somewhat higher when administered 
last, immediately after either of the other measures.
Subjects were then asked to select from those same-sexed 
persons participating in the study the six who know them best 
and turn in a list of their names in rank order. From these
4
lists, at least one high-empathy and one low-empathy friend 
and two others were selected for each subject to provide Peer 
Ratings of Empathy. Because of this selection process, these 
ratings were not obtained in time for use in defining empathy 
groups. Instead they were used in supplementary data analyses 
and statistical regroupings.
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All subjects reported to the lab for two sessions sep­
arated by two weeks to complete the Adjective Description 
Scale (ADS) as (a) a self ’-description (b) a social-self des­
cription and (c) an ideal-self-description. Half of each 
experimental empathy groups were tested in the high-OSA con­
dition in the first session and low-OSA condition in the sec­
ond session. The order was reversed for the second half.
In the high-OSA condition, subjects completed the three 
ADS descriptions while seated at a table a large mirror in 
an otherwise barren room. In the low-OSA condition, the mirror 
was replaced by a landscape art-reproduction which was judged 
to allow a distraction of relatively neutral to mildly positive 
affect.
At the end of the first session, subjects were seated 
outside the experimental rooms to complete the ADS as a peer 
description of the four selected friends. At the end of the 
second session, subjects completed the Peer-Ratings of Em­
pathy for the same selected friends. Descriptions and ratings 
from only three friends were retained for the Peer Description 
Composite and the Peer Rating of Empathy Composite: one high- 
empathy friend, one low-empathy friend, and the one of the 
two remaining friends who marked the highest confidence in 
his/her ratings. Only three of four ratings were used in 
order to reduce the unreliability of low-confidence ratings.
The same male experimenter tested all subjects throughout
the study. This .may h.aye had some effect differentially across
male and female subjects. Although this study does not focus on 
or hypothesize in regard to sex, it is used as a variable.
Results and Discussion
High and low-empathy groups were determined from compos­
ite scores on the Affective-Sensitivity Scale (A-S Scale) 
and Hogan's CPI-derived Empathy Scale (Hogan Scale). Both 
were judged to measure necessary components of "accurate 
empathy". The former appears to measure the intrapsychic 
level of empathic understanding while the latter appears to 
measure the interpersonal extension of self. The intra­
psychic understanding precedes and outweighs the interperson­
al extension of self in both the conceptual and operational 
definition of empathy. Their respective correlations to the 
composite score are 0.82 and 0.61.
Subsequent correlation matrices reveal no correlation 
among the three independent variables; sex, order, and e m ­
pathy level. The two components of the empathy composite 
show no correlation with each other. Taken separately, the 
Affective-Sensitivity scores correlate with Peer Ratings of 
Empathy at 0.43; Hogan's CPI Empathy correlates with the Peer 
Ratings at 0.31; and the Composite Empathy scores correlate 
with Peer Ratings at 0.52.
Two sets of dependent measures were analyzed in parallel 
Positivity Scores and Difference Scores. Positivity Scores 
were obtained empirically by first computing the mean scale 
response (1-5) for each item from all Ideal-Self descriptions 
and for males and females separately. Those items judged
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most desirable with means of 4.0 to 5.0 for all three groups 
were retained in the "Ideal Standard" and assigned the positive 
maximum of 5.0. Similarly, all items judged most undesirable 
with means of 1.0 to 2.0 for all three groups were also in­
cluded in the "Ideal Standard" and assigned the minimum of 
1.0. Finally negative scores were calculated by comparing 
the 38-item Ideal Standard with all Real-Self, Ideal-Self, 
Social-Self, and Peer Descriptions. The sum of the absolute 
differences for each item was designated as the negative 
score, with the Positivity score equal to (110-Negative Score).
Difference Scores were s imply the sum of all ma t ched-it em 
differences (absolute values) between two 56-item, 5-point 
scale measures. Although other researchers and measures use 
such difference scores (eg. Bills, Vance, and McLean, 1951; 
Winkler and Myers, 1963), extensive debate in the literature 
centers upon whether difference scores are useful, appropriate 
or reliable (Cronbach and Furby, 1970; O'Connor, 1972; Wylie, 
1974). In response to doubts that they actually measure such 
discrepancies as Real vs. Ideal Self, Wylie (1974) argues 
that such discrepancies are often phenomonologically ex­
perienced and valid as such. Another problem is that a dis­
crepancy score confounds and compounds the unreliability, 
variances, and error of two measures. If these measures are 
completed at the same time, however, this is reduced; if at 
different times some control data or group must be used to 
correct or compare scores. The present study uses phenomeno­
logical measures (difference scores using only Real, Ideal,
29 .
and Social) and non-phenomonological (difference scores 
using Peer descriptions) Difference scores with "Peer Des­
criptions" as a component may indeed be unrealiable and in­
valid .
The further issue of reliability is still not theore­
tically resolved (Wells and Maxwell, 1976). As a comparison, 
Positivity Scores were also chosen for analysis due to their 
improved chances for reliability as well as their cross­
subject, cross-description and cross-discrepancy score com­
parisons with a standard anchor. Furthermore, difference 
scores are often only meaningful in relationship to each 
other and comprise an undetermined number and rotation of 
"difference dimensions". Positivity scores, however, provide 
a single comparison dimension, and also provide scores for 
single descriptions which can be compared as well as "di­
rection of difference" data. Nevertheless, Difference Scores 
were also used as a further validation able to detect changes 
across more dimensions and items - a trade-off deliberately 
to allow greater "unreliavility" for the purposes of this 
study. In one sense, the systematic changes in cross-time 
and condition reliability of these descriptions and discrep­
ancies are the subject of this study.
For "Difference" data, change scores for the Real (R), 
Ideal (I), and Social (S) self-descriptions were obtained 
for each subject by summing the absolute differences bet­
ween ratings of the same item in the two sessions (The same 
average of the three Peer Descriptions for each subject was
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used for both sessions.) Shift scores for R-I, R-S, and 
I-S, and for Peer-R, Peer-I, and Peer-S,were handled in two 
ways. "Absolute Shift Scores" were derived by taking the 
absolute value of the change of a difference score from one 
session to the other. "Directional Shift Scores" were com­
puted by subtracting the two difference scores from each 
other and adding a constant, thereby preserving the direction 
of the shift in positive integer scores. Across subjects 
Absolute Shift scores tell how much fluctuation in general 
occurred, whereas Directional Shift Scores indicate how much 
a shift occurred toward greater or lesser disparity in a 
given condition.
Positivity Scores provided the only scores for single 
descriptions. Absolute and Directional Change scores for R,
I, and S were obtained by first subtracting the first session 
Positivity Score for each type of description from the second 
session score for the same type of description. The absolute 
value of each remainder was used for the Absolute Change score 
while a constant was added to each remainder for Directional 
Change Scores. Absolute and Directional Shi f t scores were 
computed in the same way as for the Difference Data.
To test the major hypotheses forwarded for this study, 
data from the experimental subjects were analyzed with sepa­
rate 2(Sex)by 2(Empathy) by 2(Condition) ANOVAs for each d e ­
pendent measure. Positivity Scores and Difference Scores are 
presented in parallel. The former provides a more reliable 
measure and more information as to the direction of discrep­
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ancies relative to an outside criterion; whereas the latter 
offers a measure more sensitive to a greater number of dimen- 
s i o n s .
Hypothesis I: in the high-OSA condition, high-empathy
subjects will report more positive Real 
Self and Social Self descriptions than 
low-empathy subjects.
An effect for Empathy Level was hypothesized for Real 
Self and Social Self in the high-OSA condition and for Peer 
Ratings, with higher scores for high-empathy subjects. Such 
effects were found to be significant for Real Self (_F (1,45) =
15.97, £ < . 0 0 1 ) ,  Social Self (F (1,45) = 9.14, p < . 0 0 4 ) ,  and 
Peer Ratings (JF (1 , 4 5 ) = 16 . 2 3 , _p^.001). There was also a 
significant effect of Empathy for Social Self descriptions 
in the low-OSA condition (_F (1 ,45)= 7.09, j j^.011).
These effects are quite consistent with the theoretical 
framework of this paper. If more accurate empathy has the 
affect of promoting successful interpersonal relationships, 
then such theorists as Harry Stack Sullivan would indeed 
hypothesize more positive real self-concepts and social self- 
concepts among high-empathy individuals, particularly in an 
objective self-aware condition. The more positive Peer D e s ­
criptions for high-empathy persons is clearly indicated and 
adds validity to the empathy measures employed.
Main effects for sex of all subjects showed higher Social 
Self-descriptions and Peer Ratings among females than males 
(F (1, 4 5) = 4.28, p < . 0 5 0  and F (1, 45) = 5 .14 , p < . 0 2 8 ) .  There were
32 .
no sex differences for either Real or Ideal descriptions.
The configurations of positive scores for each measure of 
high and low-empathy males and females and overall are are 
shown in Figure 2. Ideal descriptions were, of course, the 
most positive for all groups. Among all females the configu­
ration in descending order was: Ideal, Peer, Social, Real.
For males, the order interacted with empathy levels. Scores 
for high-empathy males tended to be ordered: Ideal, Peer,
Real, and Social with high correspondence among the latter 
three, the configuration for low-empathy males fluctuated a c ­
cording to OSA condition. With the mirror, they were in the 
same order as the high-empathy group but lowered (less po ­
sitive). Without the mirror, the Real descriptions of low- 
empathy males shifted above the Peer and the Social toward 
the Ideal Descriptions.
Generally, females believed others saw them more positive­
ly than they actually were and did describe each other more 
positively than the Real-Self descriptions. Males, on the 
other hand, had a tendency to believe others saw them about 
equally positive as they saw themselves, or even somewhat less 
positive. Peers tended to describe other males about as p o ­
sitive as those males believed they would. The configuration 
changes however, for low-empathy males in the low-OSA condi­
tion. Without the mirror, these individuals described them­
selves much more positively than they thought others would 
and more positively than others actually did.
FIGURE 2
CONFIGURATIONS OF POSITIVITY SCORE MEANS FOR CROSS-CONDITION GROUPS
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Hypothesis II: (a) High-empathy subjects will show less
of a shift in Real Self descriptions 
than low-empathy subjects across OSA 
conditions (i.e. mirror to no mirror) 
(b) The direction of shift for low-em­
pathy subjects will be toward more 
positive (or Ideal) descriptions in 
the low-OSA condition than in the high- 
OSA condition.
In support of Hypothesis II (a), both Positivity Scores 
and Difference Scores showed a strong effect of empathy by 
condition (Tables 1 & 2). The shift for low-empathy subjects 
was significantly greater than for high-empathy subjects 
(Positivity Scores: F_ (1 ,45)=8.93, j5<C*005; Difference Scores:
JF (1 , 4 5) =18 . 81, j?<.001). Since only the Directional Change 
Scores from the Positivity data can show the direction of the 
change, these were analyzed to test Hypothesis II (b). As 
hypothesized, scores for the low-empathy subjects were signi­
ficantly more positive in the non-mirror than the mirror con­
dition while high empathy subjects shifted relatively little
l
(F (1,45) = 5. 09, £ < . 0 2 9 ) .  1
Hypothesis III (a) High-empathy subjects will show less
of a shift than low-empathy subjects
in Social Self descriptions across
OSA conditions.
(b) The direction of shift for low-empathy
subjects will be toward more positive
descriptions in the low-OSA condition 
than in the high-OSA condition.
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TABLE 1
POSITIVITY DATA ACROSS OSA CONDITIONS: MEANS AND S.D.s
Dependent Empathy General Shift Directional Shift
Variable Level Male Female Male Female
Real Self
High
Low
5.58 (4.5) 6.75 C5.1) 
13.58 (6.8) 9.53 (7.7)
-0.68a(7.1) -0.32 (8.8) 
-7.92 (13.8) -6.51 (10.8)
Effects Empathy JF (1,45) =8.9 3,£<.005 Empathy F(l,45)=5.09,£<.029
Ideal Self
High
Low
4.72 (4.8) 4.73 (4.2) 
6.00 (7.4) 5.74 (4.4)
1.65 (6.9) -0.86 (6.5) 
1.84 (9.3) 1.17 (7.5)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Social Self
High
Low
4.83 (4.0) 4.50 (3.3) 
6.58 (5.3) 7.67 (5.8)
-2.87 (6.1) -2.56 (5.0) 
-4.92 (7.0) -3.01 (9.1)
Effects Empathy _F(1,45) = 3. 38,£<.0 73 n.s.
Real-Ideal
High
Low
6.21 (4.3) 11.07 (5.7) 
16.58 (9.2) 8.72 (6.3)
— 2.34 (7.6) 0.54 (12.9) 
-9.75 (15.9) -7.68 (7.7)
Effects Empathy JF(1,45)=4. 32 ,£<.043 
EmpXsex F(l,45)=10.88,£<.002
Empathy F(l,45)=5.51,£<.023
Real-Social
High
Low
6.18 (3.5) 6.81 (6.0) 
11.67 (7.7) 7.93 (4.8)
-2.18 (6.9) -2.23 (8.8) 
3.00 (14.2) 3.50 (9.2)
Effects Empathy _F( 1,4 5) =4.11 ,£<.049 Empathy F(l,45)=3.73,p<.060
Real-Peer
High
Low
5.28 (4.5) 6.75 C5.1) 
13.58 (6.8) 9.53 (7.7)
0.68 (7.1) 0.32 (8.8) 
7.92 (13.8) 6.51 (10.8)
Effects Empathy F(l,45)-8.93,£<.005 Empathy F(1,45)=5.09 ,£<.029 
EmpXsex F(l,45)=4.95,£<.031
Ideal-Social
High
Low
8.22 (6.9) 7.87 (4.4) 
8.75 (7.5) 7.36 (6.0)
-4.52 (10.0) -1.70 (9.3) 
-6.75 (9.0) -4.18 (8.4)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
4.72 (4.8) 4.73 C4.2) 
6.00 (7.4) 5.74 (.4.3)
-1.65 (6.7) 0.86 (6.4) 
-1.84 (9.3) -1.17 (7.5)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Social-Peer
High
Low
4.84 (.4.0) 4.50 (3.2) 
6.58 (5.3) 7.67 (5.8)
2.87 (6.0) 2,55 (5.0) 
4.92 (7.0) 3,01 (9.1)
Effects Empath F(1,45)=*3.38 , £ < . 0 7 3 ____________. ____________
a Negative Scores for Real, Ideal, & Social indicate less positive scores in 
in the high-OSA condition; for the others, less discrepancy in the high-OSA
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TABLE 2
DIFFERENCE DATA ACROSS OSA CONDITIONS: MEANS AND S.D.s
Dependent Empathy General Shift Directional Shift
Variable Level Male Female Male Female
Real Self
High
Low
17.03a(7.4)b 22.08 (7.0) 
33.00 (5.3) 29.37 (9.9)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects Empath F(l,45)=18. 81 ,£<.001
Ideal Self
High
Low
17.05 (8.0) 17.58 (8.6) 
27.33 (9.7) 21.76 (8.4)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects Empath F(l,45)=8. 76 ,£<005
Social Self
High
Low
22.92 (8.9) 23.16 (8.1) 
32.58 (11.4) 25.33 (8.6)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects Empath F(l,45)=5.16 ,£<028
Real-Ideal
High
Low
7.55 (5.4) 10.29 (8.0) 
19.83 (11.9) 13.71 (8.2)
-5.22c 
-9.50
(7.0) -1.57 
(19.8) -10.72
(13.1)
(11.2)
Effects Empath F(1,45)=10 .05 ,£<003 Empathl F(l,45) = 3.80,p<057
Real-Social
High
Low
9.55 (5.3) 9.54 (5.0) 
8.42 (8.0) 8.79 (6.2)
-3.08
0.08
(9.0) 0.19 
(9.9) -5.84
(7.8)
(11.8)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Real-Peer
High
Low
4.25 (4.0) 6.07 (3.0) 
10.00 (6.0) 8.79 (6.2)
-0.05
-1.34
(6.2) -3.64 
(9.6) -0.90
(4.3)
(9.6)
Effects Empath F(1,45)=8.97,£<.004 n.s.
Ideal Social
High
Low
8.97 (6.5) 9.13 (6.4) 
11.92 (7.5) 6.52 (3.7)
-4.10
-7.08
(11.0) -2.19 
(9.8) -3.45
(11.1)
(7.0)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
4.65 (3.6) 4.95 (4.3) 
8.42 (9.0) 6.10 (6.0)
-0.18
-4.00
(6.2) -0.02 
(11.2) -1.55
(6.1)
(8.7)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Social-Peer
High
Low
6.62 (4.3) 6.61 (4.1) 
5.59 (4.8) 6.02 (3.7)
-1.02
-0.59
(8.3) -1.00 
(6.9) 2.47
(7.4)
(7.1)
Effects n.s. n. s.
a Cell means; b standard deviation (in parentheses)
c Negative directional shift scores indicate a shift to less discrepancy in 
the OSA condition.
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Although Social Self descriptions were expected to ex ­
hibit much the same effect as Real Self descriptions, the 
differential shift according to empathy level across con­
dition was weaker than the interaction found using Real Self- 
descriptions. Using Positivity Scores, the Social Scores of 
high-empathy subjects were significantly higher across con­
dition (F_ (1 ,45) = 7 . 32 , jd^ O . O I )  and Social Scores were sig­
nificantly higher in the low-OSA condition across both em ­
pathy levels (F^  (1, 4 5 ) = 3 .-5 ,£ <T. 03 4 ) . However, the low- 
empathy subjects showed a slight trend to shift more across 
OSA conditions (F (1,45)=3.38, £-<.073) toward more positive 
Social Self description in the low-OSA condition.
Using Difference Scores, though, low-empathy subjects 
do show a significant trend to shift more across condition 
(I? (1,45) = 5.16, j d ^ . 028). In short, the Social Self d e scrip­
tion of all subjects shift across condition, but low-empathy 
subjects tend to shift more across condition in dimensions 
other than positivity of description. Hypothesis III (a) is 
supported, but the test for Hypothesis 111(b) shows only a 
trend in the hypothesized direction.
As a check upon the assumption that Ideal Self-Descrip­
tions do not shift significantly across condition, Positive 
Scores and Difference Scores were analyzed for possible con­
dition or empathy effects. The main effect for condition did 
not reach significance, nor did the empathy by condition inter­
action for Positive Scores. Difference Scores, however, re-
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vealed a significant interaction such that low-empathy sub­
jects were less consistent across condition (_F (1 ,45) = 8 . 76,
j><^.005). No particular direction or dimension to the shift 
is indicat ed .
Hypothesis IV: (a) High-empathy subjects will show less
of a shift than low-empathy subjects 
in reported Real/Ideal discrepancies 
across conditions.
(b) The direction of shift for low-em­
pathy subjects will be toward lowered 
self-esteem (i.e. greater Real/Ideal 
discrepancies) in the high-OSA con­
dition.
Using Positive Scores, self-esteem scores were generated 
by subtracting the Real Self-description score from the Ideal, 
a direct translation of the William James definition. Higher 
discrepancy scores indicate lower self-esteem. Using Dif­
ference Scores, the absolute differences between Real and 
Ideal scale responses for each item were totalled. Higher 
totals indicate greater discrepancies and lower self-esteem.
Hypothesis IV(a) is supported by both the Positive and 
Difference data. Positive Scores show that low-empathy sub­
jects change their reported Real-Ideal Self discrepancy more 
than high-empathy subjects across condition (IT (1,45)=4.32, 
043). This effect is even more marked with Difference 
Scores (1? (1, 4 5) =10 . 05 , j><^.003). In addition both sets of 
data reveal significant main effect of condition on non-
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directional fluctuation of Real-Ideal discrepancy (Positivity 
data: 1? (1,45)=4.40, £ < . 0 4 2 ) ;  Difference data: _F (1,45) =
6.33, £ < . 0 1 5 .  Quite interestingly, the Positive Score data 
reveals a sex by empathy by condition interaction showing 
that high-empathy females shift less than high-empathy males 
across conditions. This suggests that although empathic males 
tend to be more self-aware in areas related to self-esteem 
than less-empathic males, they are either not as self-aware 
or not as secure in their self-evaluation as empathetic fe­
males .
Hypothesis IV(b) predicts that the direction of this 
shift in Real-Ideal (self-esteem) discrepancy will be toward 
greater discrepancy for low-empathy in the high-OSA condition. 
The Positive data ANOVA supports this prediction (_F (1,45) =
5.51, £ < .  023) but the Difference data shows only a trend in 
the hypothesized direction (I? (1,45) = 3.80, £ < .  057). Only 
Positivity data shows a main effect for condition (F_ (1,45)=
5.04, £ < .  030).
Real-Ideal discrepancy appears therefore to be somewhat 
greater across all subjects in the high-OSA condition than in 
the low-OSA condition, but most significantly more so for 
low-empathy than high-empathy persons, (F ( 1,4 5 ).j=6 . 5 8 , £  <  . 0 14) .
Hypothesis V: (a) High-empathy subjects will show less
of a shift than low-empathy subjects 
in reported Social-Ideal Self dis­
crepancies across OSA conditions.
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(b) Low-empathy subjects will shift more 
than high-empathy subjects in the di ­
rection of greater Social-Ideal dis­
crepancy in the high-OSA condition.
Neither Hypothesis V(a) nor Hypothesis V(b) is supported 
by either the Positivity or Difference data. There is neither 
a main effect of empathy, nor an empathy by condition inter­
action. Nevertheless, both sets of data indicate a signifi­
cant main effect of OSA condition for both non-direction and 
directional shift. Non-directional p values for Positivity 
and Difference data are .050 and .019, respectively; for di­
rectional shift the corresponding p-values are .002 and .042. 
Generally, both high and low-empathy subjects show greater 
Social-Ideal discrepancy in the high-OSA condition than in 
the low-OSA condition.
Hypothesis VI: In the low-OSA condition, high-empathy
subjects will show greater correspond­
ence between Social Self and Peer Des­
criptions than low-empathy subjects.
Hypothesis VI was supported by both Positivity Scores 
and Difference Scores. Positivity Scores show that in the 
low-OSA condition high-empathy persons report Social Self 
scores that correspond to the Peer Descriptions they receive 
more closely than low-empathy persons (F_ (1,45)=4.53, £ < .  039) . 
However, Social Self descriptions from high-empathy females 
correspond better to their Peer Descriptions than do those
41.
from high-empathy males (_F (1,45)=9.56, £<1.003).
Difference Scores also show that in the low-OSA condi­
tion high-empathy persons report Social Self descriptions 
that correspond to Peer Descriptions better than low- em ­
pathy persons (I[ (1, 45 ) = 10 . 05 , £*C.003).
Hypothesis VII: In the low-OSA condition, high-empathy
subjects will show greater correspond­
ence between Real Self and Peer D e s ­
criptions than low-empathy subjects.
Hypothesis VII is not supported by Positivity Scores.
No main effects or interactions for Real-Peer discrepancies 
were found using just the positive-negative dimension. D i f ­
ference Scores, however, offer strong support of the hyp o ­
thesis. In the low-OSA condition high-empathy subjects show 
far better correspondence between Real Self and Peer descrip­
tions they receive than low-empathy subjects (I? (1,45) = 9. 66,
£ < .  003) .
Although Positivity Scores do not show greater or less 
iscrepancy between Real and Peer descriptions within each 
condition, low-empathy subjects do change their levels of 
reported discrepancy across condition more than high-empathy 
subjects (_F (1,45)=8.93, £ < . 0 0 5 ) .  Difference Scores also 
show that correspondence between Real and Peer descriptions 
changes more for low-empathy subjects across condition (_F(1.45) 
= 8.97, £ < . 0 0 4 ) .  Positivity Score data further show a direc­
tional shift such that low-empathy subjects shift their Real 
Self descriptions to more positive in respect to Peer Descrip­
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tions in the low-OSA condition and less positive in the high- 
OSA condition; whereas high-empathy persons shift relatively 
little (_F (1,45)=5.09, £ < . 0 2 9 ) .  There is also a directional 
Empathy by Sex interaction showing that this empathy effect is 
more marked for males than females (F^  (i,45)=4.95, £ < . 0 3 1 ) .
Most of the sex effects and interactions in this study 
seem to be due to the higher Positivity Scores in Social Self 
and Peer Descriptions of females than males, particularly 
high-empathy females. This finding may reflect: (a) the
tendency of females to regard others more positively and to 
expect to be so regarded themselves by other females, (b) 
socio-cultural influences that do not reward men as much as 
women for extending empathic understanding— particularly with 
the same sex, or (c) the effect of a male experimenter either 
causing other males to be more conservative and critical or 
causing females to present themselves as more interpersonally 
acceptable and charitable to others.
TABLE 3
POSITIVITY DATA WITHIN OSA CONDITIONS: CELL MEANS AND S.D.s
Low-OSA Condition
Variable Level Male Female
Real Self
High 58.68 (13.4) 60.69 (12.0)
Low 54.84 (13.2) 50.48 (13.9)
Effects n.s.
Ideal Self
High 90.04 (7.6) 88.61 (9.1)
Low 83.92 (12.4) 84.20 (9.7)
Effects n.s.
Social Self
High 58.25 (12.2) 67.04 (10.7)
Low 50.33 (15.1) 52.33 (18.1)
Effects Empathy_F(1.45) == 7.09 ,£<.011
Sex F(l,45)=3.76,£<.059
Peer Desc.
High 58.60 (7.2) 69.57 (9.6)
Low 51.42 (8.7) 53.52 (11.9)
Effects Empathy_F( 1,4 5 ) ==16.2 3,£<.001
Sex F(l,45)=5.14,p<.028
Real-Ideal
High 31.35 (12.9) 27.91 (9.6)
Low 29.08 (15.3) 33.73 (11.6)
Effects n.s.
Real-Social
High 4.16 (2.8) 8.73 (3.9)
Low 9.50 (4.8) 5.93 (2.9)
Effects EmpXsex F(l,45) =4.40 ,£<.042
Real-Peer
High 14.31 (8.7) 11.89 (7.9)
Low 14.08 (10.4) 17.00 (12.3)
Effects
Ideal-Social
High
n.s.
31.78 (12.5) 21.57 (10.4)
Low 33.58 (19.4) 31.88 (15.5)
Effects n.s.
Ideal-Peer
High 31.43 (10.7) 19.04 (10.6)
Low 32.50 (18.1) 31.54 (15.4)
Effects n.s.
Social-Peer
High 12.11 (7.0) 8.68 (4.3)
Low 11.75 (5.8) 21.53 (13.1)
Effects Empathy F(l,45) =4. 53,£<. 039
EmpXsex F(l,45) =9.56 ,£.<.003
High-OSA Condition
Male Female
58.00 (14.4) 60.38 (10.0)
46.92 (12.5) 43.96 (12.6)
EmpathyF(l,45)=15.9 7.,£<.001
91.68 (5.9) 87.75 (10.1)
85.76 (11.0) 85.38 (8.3)
n.s,
55.41 (12.6) 64.48 (12.0)
45.42 (12.1) 49.32 (17.4)
EmpathyF(l.45)=9.14 ,j><.004
Sex JF(1,45)=4.28,£<.050
NA NA
NA NA
33.68 (11.5) 27.38 (13.8)
38.83 (14.8) 41.41 (11.9)
EmpathyF(1,45) =6.58, £<.014
4.58 (3.6) 5.93 (3.1)
7.83 (4.7) 8.72 (4.2)
Empathy_F( 1,45) = 3. 77,p<.059
10.91 (9.1) 9.57 (7.3)
9.68 (10.2) 16.0 7 (13.7)
n.s.
36.30 (12.1) 23.40 (14.8)
40.34 (19.1) 36.06 (16.6)
n.s.
33.08 (10.7) 19.18 (12.1)
34.34 (18.4) 32.86 (13.2)
n.s.
15.14 (8.5) 9.89 (5.8)
11.17 (7.3) 18.52 (12.8)
EmpXsex _F(1,45) = 7. 53,£<.009
1 Cell means
2 Standard deviations (in parentheses)
TABLE 4
DIFFERENCE DATA WITHIN OSA CONDITIONS: MEANS AND S.D.s
Dependent Empathy Low-OSA Condition High-OSA Condition
Variable Level Male Female Male Female
Real-Ideal
High
Low
47.32
51.58
(16.4)
(18.9)
44.13
49.83
(11.0)
(15.4)
52.53 (16.5) 45.71 
61.08 (17.4) 60.54
(14.4)
(12.6)
Effects n.s Empathy F(1,45)=7.49 ,p<.009
Real-Social
High
Low
24.75
35.17
(9.0)
(8.3)
27.88
26.27
(9.1)
(5.4)
27.83 (5.5) 27.70 
35.08 (11.3) 32.11
(9.7) 
(11.6)
Effects EmpXsex F(l,45) = 7.06 ,£<011 Empathy F(l,45)=4.38,£<.042
Real-Peer
High
Low
38.93
45.08
(8.3)
(11.2)
37.19
46.77
(6.9)
(9.0)
38.90 (6.0) 41.04 
46.58 (7.8) 47.74
(7.5)
(11.8)
Effects Empathy .F(l,45)=9.66,£<003 Empathy F(1,45)=8.50,£<.006
Ideal-Social
High
Low
50.87
58.92
(16.7)
(24.1)
41.34
52.56
(12.9)
(19.7)
54.97 (14.7) 43.53 
66.00 (22.4) 56.01
(19.1)
(18.6)
Effects n.s • Empathy F(1,45)=4.77,£<.034
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
55.07
59.83
(13.2)
(23.6)
44.40
57.26
(11.6)
(17.0)
55.25 (10.5) 44.42 
63.58 (16.7) 59.00
(12.5)
(13.2)
Effects n.s • Empathy _F(1,45)=8. 52 ,£<.005
Social-Peer
High
Low
39.55
45.58
(10.8)
(5.4)
38. 75 
49.41
(8.8)
(11.1)
40.67 (7.5) 39.82 
46.00 (8.1) 46.95
(10.4)
(11.2)
Effects Empathy ]?(1,45)=10.05, £ < 0 0  3 Empathy f^(l,45)=5.21.,£<.027
a Cell means
b Standard deviations (in parentheses)
EXPERIMENT II
Gough and Heilbrun (1965) suggest that stability and 
instability of self-image and self-concept may reflect "a 
personological disposition not just statistical error. They 
found that persons with high stability coefficients over 
time on the Adjective Checklist were more often described 
as cheerful, confident, cooperative, energetic, friendly, 
insightful, spontaneous, and versatile; persons with low 
stability coefficients over time on the ACL were described 
as awkward, painstaking, arrogant, prejudiced, resentful, 
and smug..."at odds with himself and others" (Gough &
Heilbrun, 1965). Therefore, it is not unlikely that high- 
empathy subjects would report less of a shift in self-con­
cept than low-empathy subjects over t i m e , rather than just 
across conditions.
Although this expectation is consistent with the theo­
retical basis of the present study, such an effect would be 
confounded with the findings for "non-directional shift" of 
self-concept across sessions reported for Experiment I. If 
the significant effects reported were due only to differential 
changes across time rather than the OSA manipulations, then 
we would only have very indirect evidence that high-empathy 
subjects are more typically self-aware than low-empathy sub­
jects.
In order to check whether the previously discussed ef­
fects of Experiment I were actually due to the change in OSA
45 .
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condition or simply the change across time, comparison with 
subject groups receiving the same condition across time is 
n e c e s s a r y .
Method
Subj ect s
Sixteen males and sixteen females volunteered from 
college fraternities and sororities. All subjects were 
well-known by at least three other study participants (who 
provided Peer Ratings of Empathy and Peer Descriptions). 
Subjects were paid $3.00 each for their participation.
Apparatus and Measures
Materials, testing conditions, and the measures used 
were identical to those used in Experiment I.
Pro cedur e
As in Experiment I, subjects were tested in groups of 
three or 4 upon the CPI Empathy Scale and the Affective- 
Sensitivity Scale, counterbalanced for order of administration. 
These subjects were tested with the subjects from Experiment I 
and represent those subjects who were subsequently assigned 
to the experimental groups based on composite empathy scores 
matching the scores of subjects in Experiment I in the same 
high and low-empathy groups.
Four males and four females in each of the two empathy 
groups received the low-OSA condition in both of the two sub­
sequent sessions (Group A) while the other four males and 
other four females in each empathy group received the high-OSA 
condition in both sessions (Group B). This resulted in a 
2(Sex) by 2(Empathy level) by 2(0SA condition) design with
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four subjects in each of the eight cells. Except for the 
assignment of each subject to the same OSA condition across 
sessions, all procedures were the same as in Experiment I.
Results and Discuss ion 
Positivity Scores and Difference Scores for each group 
were analyzed in 2(Sex) by 2(0SA condition) by 2(Empathy)
ANOVAs. Note that OSA Condition replaces Order of Condition 
since each subject received the same condition in both sessions. 
Only changes due to cross-session shifts were analyzed for 
comparison with Experiment I groups in order to evaluate the 
findings for Hypotheses II, III, IV, and V.
Pos i t ive Scores
In analyzing the shift across time for Real Self, Ideal 
Self, and Social Self Descriptions, no significant difference- 
shift was noted due to sex, empathy, group, session or any 
interactions. Therefore, the Positivity data effects support­
ing Hypotheses II and III appear to be due to changes across 
condition rather than time.
Real-Ideal discrepancies did shift more across time for 
Group A (low-OSA) than Group B (high-OSA) (_F (1,24)=5.33, 
£ < . 0 3 0 )  and a group by empathy interaction shows that low- 
empathy subjects in the low-OSA Group shifted more in Real- 
Ideal discrepancy than high-empathy subjects (F (1,24)=7.72, 
£ < . 0 1 0 )  , but not significantly in any direction. Although 
this tends to discount change in condition as critical for 
Hypothesis IV(a), Hypothesis IV(b) (significant direction
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of shift) still appears to be due to the change in OSA con­
ditions, low-empathy persons may shift at random more than 
high-empathy persons across time, but not significantly to­
ward either greater or lesser discrepancy.
Social-Ideal discrepancies show significantly greater 
shift across time for all persons in the low-OSA Group 
(F_ (1,24)=6.90, jp<^.015). A sex by group interaction shows 
that males in the low-OSA group shift significantly more a- 
cross time than females (j? (1, 24)=8.73, _p<.007). Both of
these effects are for non-directional fluctuation with no 
effects for shift toward or away from greater discrepancy. 
Since no interactions with empathy were found here, the em­
pathy by condition interactions found in Experiment I for 
Hypothesis V must be due to the hypothesized change across 
conditions rather than time. Non-directional shifting due 
to sex and condition, however, can be largely attributed to 
shifting across time.
Difference Scores
In analyzing shift scores across time for Real Self,
Ideal Self, and Social Self, main effects of empathy were 
found for non-directional Real Self shifts (JT (1,24)=7.08, 
jd<C.014) and Ideal Self (I[ (1,24) = 5.10, _p<\ 033). Although 
the F-ratio for the empathy effects across cond it ion in 
Experiment I are much larger, some of the non-directional 
shift due to empathy across condition can be accounted for 
by empathy across t ime effects. In other words, empathic 
persons will shift less across time as well as less across
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OSA conditions. This weakens difference data support for 
Hypothesis 11(a) (nondirectional shift) as a function strictly 
of change of condition. The lack of any effect for shift of 
Social-Self descriptions across time lends further difference 
data support that Hypothesis 111(a) effects are due primarily 
to changes in condition rather than just time.
Shifts in Real-Ideal discrepancy tend to show greater 
over-time fluctuation for low-empathy subjects than high-em­
pathy subjects in the low-OSA Group (_F (1,24)=4.29, j><T.049). 
Again, this empathy by group interaction is only significant 
for nondirectional data. There are no effects to indicate 
that consistently more or less discrepancy occurs over time 
alone. Since the effect for Hypothesis IV (a) showed a much 
more significant p value (.003), it is likely that Hypothesis 
IV(a) still shows effects of condition rather than just time.
No general fluctuation of Social-Ideal discrepancy is 
indicated by the Difference Scores. However an empathy by 
group interaction for directional shift indicates that high- 
empathy persons in the high-OSA group tend to significantly 
decrease discrepancies over time (JF (1,24)=4.91, p_<C.036). 
Since the high-OSA Group (Experiment II) is a control for 
the high-to-low OSA experimental group (Experiment I), which 
shows an increase for high empathy across conditions, this 
control effect accounts for the change leaving a "no change" 
balance for this experimental high-empathy result - - thereby 
increas ing rather than decreasing the hypothesized effect for 
Hypothesis V.
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TABLE 5
POSITIVITY DATA WITHIN EXPERIMENT 2 SESSIONS, BY CONDITION-GROUP1
Dependent Empathy Session 1 Session 2
Variable Level Low--OSA High-OSA Low-OSA High--OSA
Real Self
High
Low
a b 
58.25 (6.5)
58.00 (7.3)
59.00
55.13
(12.6)
(11.6)
61.25
55.88
(7.7)
(12.9)
63.62
57.50
(13.6)
(7.7)'
Effects n. s. n. s.
Ideal Self
High
Low
91.88
94.50
(8.9) 
(10.3)
90.38
91.00
(8.5)
(12.1)
93.38
87.75
(8.4)
(12.4)
90.25
93.00
(10.0)
(15.1)
Effects n. s. n. s.
Social Self
High
Low
62.00
62.25
(17.5)
(6.0)
59.88
52.88
(13.1)
(17.3)
61.00
57.50
(14.4)
(11.6)
62.50
54.25
(15.2)
(11.4)
Effects n .s. n .s.
Real-Ideal
High
Low
33.62
36.50
(9.7)
(12.0)
31.38
35.88
(12.4)
(5.7)
31.12
27.88
(9.8)
(15.4)
26.62
35.75
(10.1)
(8.5)
Effects n. s. n .s.
Real-Social
High
Low
9.50
8.75
(7.5)
(5.2)
7.38
10.00
(4.7)
(5.2)
7.25
8.62
(5.6)
(7.8)
3.88
8.12
(3.8)
(5.1)
Effects n. s. n .s.
Real-Peer
High
Low
13.75
13.50
(9.3)
(6.6)
9.88
9.75
(5.5)
(9.7)
14.75
17.12
(8.8)
(10.4)
8.38
11.12
(6.5)
(10.8)
Effects n.s • n .s.
Ideal-Social
High
Low
29.88
29.75
(12.2)
(11.4)
30.50
35.62
(14.1)
(14.6)
28.88
25.25
(14.0)
(16.9)
27.75
38.62
(12.5)
(11.3)
Effects n. s.
4
n .s.
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
26.12
34.00
(15.2)
(16.2)
27.25
42.88
(15.9)
(16.4)
25.62
31.75
(16.2)
(8.3)
27.12
44.88
(14.9)
(18.9)
Effects Empathy F( 1,24) =4.02 ,j><054 Empathy JF(1,24)=4. 34 ,£<.048
Social-Peer
High
Low
19.00
9.50
(12.2)
(5.8)
7.00(5.7) 
17.00 (13.5)
17.00
13.00
(8.3)
(13.3)
10.62
13.75
(6.6)
(9.0)
Effects OSAxEMP F( 1,24) =6. 38 ,£<019 n .s.
a Cell mean ; b Standard deviation (in parentheses)
1 Data is collapsed across sex since no main or interaction effects of sex 
were found.
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TABLE 6
POSITIVITY DATA ACROSS EXPERIMENT 2 SESSIONS, BY CONDITION-GROUP
Dependent Empathy General Shift Directional Shift
Variable Level Low-OSA High-OSA Low-OSA High-•OSA
Real Self
High
Low
5.502
7.38
(2.3)3 5.88 
(7.2) 5.38
(3.2)
(4.8)
3.00
-2.12
(6.0) 4.62 
(10.7) 4.25
(5.7)
(6.7)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Ideal Self
High
Low
4.50
15.75
(2.1) 3.62 
(15.9) 5.25
(3.8)
(6.4)
1.00(5.1) -0.25 
-11.75 (19.8) 4.00
(5.3)
(8.4)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Social Self
High
Low
11.00
10.75
(8.2) 6.62 
(8.2) 8.50
(3.1)
(7.3)
3.00
-7.25
(14.1) 2.62 
(11.8) -2.50
(7.2)
(11.6)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Real-Ideal
High
Low
4.75
16.38
(5.7) 6.00 
(9.4) 3.88
(4.5)
(2.2)
2.50
8.75
(7.4) 4.75 
(18.9) 0.25
(5.7)
(4.8)
Effects EMPxOSA F(l,24)=7. 72,p<010 
OSAgrp F(l,24)=5.33,p4C.030
n.s.
Real-Social
High
Low
10.62
10.62
(5.1) 5.25
(5.2) 6.62
(4.9)
(7.5)
-3.00
-5.12
(12.2) -2.50 
(11.9) -3.12
(7.2)
(10.2)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Real-Peer
High
Low
5.50
7.38
(2.3) 5.88 
(7.2) 10.38
(3.3)
(4.9)
-3.00
2.12
(5.9) -4.62 
(10.7) -4.25
(5.7)
(6.7)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Ideal-Social
High
Low
10.00
13.25
(5.6) 6.00
(8.7) 5.25
(3.9)
(5.8)
2.00
4.50
(12.7) 2.75 
(16.6) -3.00
(7.3)
(7.6)
Effects OSAgrp F(l,24)=6.90,£<.015 n.s.
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
4.50
15.75
(2.1) 3.62 
(15.8) 5.25
(3.6)
(6.3)
-1.00
11.75
(5.1) 0.25 
(19.8) -4.00
(5.2)
(8.1)
Effects n.s. n.s.
Social-Peer
High
Low
11.00
10.75
(8.2) 6.62 
(8.2) 8.50
(3.1)
(7.3)
-3.00
7.25
(14.1) -2.62 
(11.7) 2.00
(7.2)
(11.6)
Effects n.s. n.s.
1 Data is collapsed across sex; no sex main effects or interactions
2 Means
3 Standard deviations (in parentheses)
TABLE 7
DIFFERENCE DATA WITHIN EXPERIMENT 2 SESSIONS, BY CONDITION-GROUP1
Dependent Empathy Session 1 Session 2
Variable Level Low--OSA High-OSA Low-OSA High-OSA
Real-Ideal
High
Low
a b 
55.75 (15.3)
58.62 (13.5)
51.50
59.12
(11.6)
(11.6)
49 .00 
46.62
(14.8)
(19.3)
41.25
54.62
(11.1)
(13.2)
Effects n .s. n .s.
Real-Social
High
Low
31.13
26.88
(11.3)
(13.5)
27.62
29.62
(8.1)
(8.7)
25.50
27.50
(11-5)
(17.1)
23.62
25.12
(11.1)
(5.9)
Effects n. s. n.s.
Real-Peer
High
Low
42.62
47.38
(10.6)
(6.4)
43.50
50.25
(11.1)
(7.0)
42.12
42.38
(9.2)
(7.4)
40.62
45.50
(10.1)
(7.2)
Effects n. s. n. s.
Ideal-Social
High
Low
54.62
55.00
(11.7)
(7.8)
54.88
57.75
(15.1)
(14.1)
53.88
45.62
(18.1)
(14.4)
46.12
61.00
(16.0)
(13.8)
Effects EmpXsex F(1,24)=4.25:,£<.050 n. s.
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
53.00
64.38
(16.8)
(11.5)
54.38
65.75
(14.6)
(17.4)
51.62
58.00
(17.1)
(7.2)
51.88
72.38
(16.3)
(21.4)
Effects Empathy _F(1,24)=3. 86 ,£<.061 Empathy F(l,24)=4.66,£<.041
Social-Peer
High
Low
45.88
47.00
(11.7)
(10.4)
42.62
49.62
(11.4)
(12.9)
44.75
44.38
(10.5)
(9.0)
42.25
47.38
(12.3)
(5.1)
Effects n.s. EmpXsex F(1,24)=4. 37 ,£<.047
a mean
b standard deviation (in parentheses) 
1 data is collapsed across sex
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TABLE 8
DIFFERENCE DATA ACROSS EXPERIMENT 2 SESSIONS, BY CONDITION-GROUP*
Dependent Empathy General Shift Directional Shift
Variable Level Low-OSA High-OSA Low-OSA High-OSA
Real Self
High
Low
22.00b 
30.00
(5.1)C 15.62 
(17.2) 30.00
(6.9)
(10.4)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects Empathy _F(1,24) = 7.08,£<.014
Ideal Self
High
Low
18.75
31.50
(7.2) 13.62 
(18.4) 22.75
(4.1)
(10.3)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects Empathy JF(1,24)=5.10 ,p<.033
Social Self
High
Low
31.50
32.88
(11.3) 21.12 
(22.0) 27.50
(6.1)
(9.1)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects n.s.
Real-Ideal
High
Low
7.50
15.50
(9.9) 10.25 
(10.7) 5.75
(6.0)
(7.3)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Effects EMPxOSA F (1,24) =4. 29 ,£<.049
Real-Social
High
Low
6.00
14.38
(6.8) 5.25 
(11.7) 6.25
(4.7)
(4.7)
2.50
2.75
(9.1)
(17.2)
4.00
4.50
(6.0)
(7.1)
Effects n.s. n ,s.
Real-Peer
High
Low
3. 75 
5.88
(3.8) 5.38 
(4.4) 5.00
(2.6)
(3.2)
1.00
5.12
(5.5)
(5.0)
2.88
4.75
(4.8)
(3.6)
Effects n.s. n .s.
Ideal-Social
High
Low
13.50
11.62
(7.8) 8.75
(12.8) 6.25
(7.7)
(6.6)
1.50
9.38
(5.1)
(7.8
8.75
-3.25
(4.9)
(4.6)
Effects n.s. EMPxOSA F(l, 24)=4.91 , p<. 036
Ideal-Peer
High
Low
5.50
12.12
(3.6) 4.62 
(5.5) 8.38
(3.0)
(12.8)
1.50
6.62
(7.1)
(10.9)
2.38
-6.88
(5.0)
(13.9)
Effects Empathy _F(1,24)=3.62,£<.069
Social-Peer
High
Low
10.25
8.12
(6.5) 3.00 
(5.4) 6.12
(2.6)
(5.9)
2.00
5.25
(12.5)
(8.0)
0.50
2.12
(3.6)
(5.8)
Effects OSAgrp F(l,24)=5.02,£<.035 n .s.
a Data is collapsed across sex; no sex main effects or interactions 
b Means
c Standard deviations (in parentheses)
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In general, it appears that in the low-OSA condition 
low-empathy subjects are more likely to fluctuate non-system- 
atically (neither consistently toward or away from greater 
shift/disparity) across time than high-empathy subjects. This 
non-directional effect found for some of the Control Groups 
parallels findings by Gough & Heilbrun (1965) that persons 
described as less confident, adjusted, and socially skilled 
show greater cross-time unreliability on the Adjective Check­
list (ACL). However, even these few cross-time effects are 
much less pronounced than the corresponding cross-condition 
effects reported in Experiment I.
Exploratory Findings
In both Experiments 1 and 2, three other sets of m e a s ­
ures were also taken: Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (RSE),
the Repression-Sensitization Scale (R-S Scale), and the three 
components of Fenigstein's Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS).
Self Esteem (RSE) correlates positively with Hogan's Empathy 
Scale (.24), and negatively with the Repression-Sensitiza- 
tion Scale (-.53), both significant beyond the .05 level.
By simply omitting cases reporting the highest level of self­
esteem these correlations become .46, and -.54, respectively, 
both significant beyond the .01 level. Additional correla­
tions of self-esteem with the Composite Empathy Score (.27) 
and Peer Ratings of Empathy (.22) appear when the highest 
extreme is omitted, suggesting that extreme self-esteem 
scores may inhibit empathy with an otherwise positively-
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skewed correlation. It is possible that extremely high 
self-esteem scores suggest some defensive style detrimental 
to the development of empathy.
The Repression-Sensitization scores tend to show nega­
tive correlations to H o g a n ’s Empathy Scale (-.29) Composite 
Empathy Scores (-.22) and Public and Social Self-Conscious­
ness (.34; .36). R-S scores showed no correlation with
either Affective-Sensitivity or Private Self-Consciousness.
The high R-S scores indicate increasing sensitization while 
the low scores indicate repression. The negative correla­
tion (-.53) of R-S scores with reported self-esteem repli­
cates the findings of Feder (1968). Again, it is possible 
that the above relationships are curvilinear. Trend analyses, 
however, were not performed. It may be that repression and 
denial inhibit intrapsychic empathic understanding while 
sensitization and inte11ectualization inhibit interpersonal 
empathic extension of the self.
Aside from their moderate correlations with Sensitiza­
tion and low self-esteem, Public and Social Self-Conscious­
ness correlate with each other at .23 and negatively with 
Hogan's Empathy Scale (-.25 and -.35, respectively). Private 
Self-Consciousness, however, correlates moderately with all 
measures of empathy: A-S (.20), Hogan (.25), Composite (.30), 
and Peer Ratings (.30). If, as Fenigstein, et al, suggest, 
it is a measure of intrapsychic self-awareness, a positive 
correlation is quite consistent with the s tudy’s theoretical
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position. Being a face-valid, self-report measure, "private 
self-consciousness" may still be contaminated with social 
desirability, defensive, or "subjective" self-awareness ef­
fects. This is suggested by the increased correlations shown 
between Private Self-Consciousness and measures of empathy 
when persons reporting the highest (defensive?) levels of 
self-esteem are excluded from analysis: A-S (.35), Hogan
(.29), Composite (.43), and Peer Ratings (.38).
The above statistics, while offering a superficial 
impression of the inter-active nature of self-awareness, em­
pathy, defensiveness, and self-esteem, are intended to sug­
gest future analyses (as covariate independent, or dependent 
variables) and research outside the scope of this paper. Of 
the three exploratory measures, only the Self-Consciousness 
scales clearly showed the expected linear relationships with 
empathy and other measures. Both self-esteem and R-S defen­
sive scores show correlations that suggest curvilinear re­
lationships with empathy such that the extremes of both scales 
may correspond to the low empathy.
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TABLE 9
CORRELATIONS AMONG EMPATHY MEASURES AND EXPLORATORY DATA 
All Subjects: N=87______________________________________________
Measures: A-S-Emp CPI-Emp CoEmp PeerEm RSE RepSen PrivSC PubSC
A-S Empathy
CPI Empathy .05 ---
Compos. Empathy .82** .61** ---
Peer Empathy .43** .31* .52 ** . - —
Self Esteem-RSE -.08 .24* .08 -.07 ---
Repres-Sensitiz -.08 -.29* -.22 -.05 -.53** ---
Private Self- 
Consciousn 
Public Self- 
Consciousn 
Social Anxiety
.20
.05
.06
.2§*
-.25*
-.35*
.30 * 
-.11 
-.16
.30*
.03
.00
-.05 -.01 
-.23 .34* .07 
-.27 * .36* -.06 .26*
* p <.05
** p<.01
All subjects minus those at the top level of RSE Self-Esteem: N=62
Measures: AS-Emp CPI-Emp CoEmp PeerEmp RSE RepSen PrivSC Pub SC
A-S Empathy --
CPI Empathy .11
Compos. Empathy .84** .63** ---
Peer Empathy .43** .32* .51** ---
Self Esteem-RSE .02 .46** .27* .22 --
Repres-Sensitiz -.08 -.35* -.25* -.13 -.54** —
Private Self 
Consciousn 
Public Self- 
Consciousn 
Social Anxiety
.35*
.00
.05
.29*
-.22
-.40*
.43**
-.13
-.18
.38
.02
-.01
.06 .01 
-.23 .37* .14 
-.33* .42** -.06 .30*
p <.05
p <.01
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Empathy Effects
In defining "empathy", the use of at least a two-part 
composite appears to be appropriate. The lack of correla­
tion between the Affective-Sensitivity Scale (intrapsychic 
understanding) and Hogan's EPI-based Empathy Scale (inter­
personal extension) suggests these are two distinct compo­
nents. However, both show correlations with Peer Ratings 
of Empathy as well as Private Self-Consciousness. The use of 
the Composite Empathy Scores is supported by the finding that 
it correlates more positively with Peer Ratings of Empathy 
and Private Self-Consciousness than either of its components.
The most important finding within conditions is that 
high-empathy persons of both sexes reported more positive 
real self, ideal self, and social self concepts than low-em­
pathy persons. Furthermore, others also offered more positive 
descriptions of high-empathy subjects. Under the "usual" 
low-OSA condition, the real-ideal self discrepancies of both 
groups were roughly similar; under the high-OSA condition, 
low-empathy subjects reported significantly larger real-ideal 
discrepancies. This is consistent with the exploratory re ­
sults that suggest extreme self-esteem scores from some sub­
jects may be "defensive", resulting in a positive curvilinear 
relationship with empathy.
Another important finding is that, under the low-OSA
6 1.
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condition, high-empathy subjects' social self-concepts more 
clearly correspond to peer descriptions; i.e., how others 
actually do view them. This suggests that empathic persons 
are indeed more perceptive of the views and reactions of 
others - an important characteristic for both developing one's 
own accurate view of self and others and successfully inter­
acting with others. Similarly, the real self-concepts of high- 
empathy subjects more closely respond to peer descriptions.
This further supports the views of Rogers (1959; 1975), and 
Sullivan (1953) that persons with successful relationships 
involving high-empathy and genuineness will have more inte­
grated "selves", e.g. real, social, actual selves.
Across OSA conditions, high-empathy subjects reported less 
of a shift in real self concept than low-empathy subjects. 
Low-empathy subjects shifted more than high-empathy subjects 
when self-awareness was externally induced (high-OSA condi­
tion) , particularly in the the direction of less positive self- 
evaluations . The relative stability of high-empathy self-de­
scriptions across conditions adds strong support to the notion 
that empathic persons are more characteristically self-aware 
than non-empathic persons. This is perhaps the most critical 
finding in the study from the theoretical point of view.
An alternative explanation of this effect is that low- 
empathy subjects merely became more self-critical under the 
high-OSA condition. Since the shift was even greater for items 
other than the positive-negatively valued ones, this alterna­
tive is less tenable. Either explanation, however, is consis­
tent with speculation that the OSA manipulation induces self­
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awareness beyond the subjective or ego-defensive structure, 
and that low-empathy persons otherwise evaluate themselves 
with weaker or more extensive ego-defensive, subjective 
biases. Since low-empathy persons more readily increased 
their reported real/ideal self discrepancies in the high-OSA 
condition, it is not unreasonable to suspect that some of the 
extremely high self-esteem scores (RSE) reported by low-empathy 
persons reflects a less stable, more defensive mode of self- 
evaluation .
High-empathy subjects also showed less of a shift in their 
descriptions of how others viewed them (social-self). Low- 
empathy subjects tended more to shift to less positive social 
self descriptions in the high-OSA condition. Particularly in 
the low-OSA condition, high-empathy subjects showed greater 
congruance among real-self, social-self, and peer-given de­
scriptions than low-empathy subjects. On the high-OSA condi­
tion, however, low-empathy subjects reported increased con- 
gruity between real-self and social-self descriptions. In­
stead of viewing themselves as better than others saw them 
(as in the low-OSA condition), low-empathy subjects shifted 
their self-descriptions to level more similar in all dimen­
sions and slightly less positive than their lowered social- 
self description. This lends support to the notion that low- 
empathy subjects are subjective or defensive in the low-OSA 
than the high-OSA condition; whereas the views of high empathy 
subjects are more consistently congruent even without the OSA 
m a n i p u l a t i o n .
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These results are consistent with re 
son findings that the amount of comparis 
social reality a person achieves and acc 
accuracy of the compaison (Radloff, 1966 
with others not only to evaluate specifi 
and abilities but also to evaluate their 
selves (Singer, 1966; Wheeler, 1966). C 
choices and acceptance varies with one's 
(Singer, 1966).
Objective Self-Awareness
All the previous between-subject findings of research in 
objective self-awareness have been replicated within subject 
in this study. Real-self and social-self descriptions became 
more self-critical and congruent with other self-measures. 
Real/ideal self discrepancies became more pronounced. However,
this effect varies with level of empathy.
Before the OSA theory was formulated, Boyd and Sisney
(1967) found striking changes in self-concepts and concepts of
interpersonal behavior of inpatients. . . following self-
image confrontation via video tape." "Interpersonal concepts 
of the self, the ideal self, and the public self became less 
pathological and less discrepant with one another." The pre­
sent study finds parallel results using the OSA manipulation 
with college students.
The theory underlying the OSA manipulations attempts to 
explain these results. By relecting attention back onto the 
self as a social object, seen from a social perspective
cent social compari- 
on with others and 
epts determines the 
) . People compare 
c opinions, traits, 
opinions of them- 
onversely, comprison 
level of self-esteem
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(Dierner..& Srull, 1979), the objective view of the self stands 
in dissonance with the previous subject self-view (Duval & 
Wicklund, 19 72). This dissonance results in an aversive 
motivational state (Zanna, Higgins, & T a v e s , 1976; Wicklund, 
1974). The effects of self-evaluation and evaluations from 
others become more salient— often increasing awareness of in­
ternal states and more internal, covert aspects of the self 
(Fenigstein, 1979; Scheier & Carver, 1977). Not only does ob­
jective self-awareness affect self-esteem, but it also in­
creases attributions made to the self (Duval & Wicklund, 1973). 
Moreover, these interact such that persons with low self­
esteem will actively avoid objective self-aware states (Davis 
& Brock, 1975). However, self-attributions may or may not be 
accurate. The study by Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, and Hormuth 
(1979) shows that objective self awareness not only increases 
responsivity and attributions to the self, but also prevents 
false responses and attributions due to a placebo drug. This 
also reinforces earlier evidence that objective self-awareness 
increases the accuracy of self-perception when validated 
against observer and behavioral information (Pryor, Wicklund,
I
Fazio, and Hood, 1977; Wicklund, 1974).
There is some disagreement as to why states of objective 
self-awareness may be more aversive or more avoided by some 
people. Some writers suggest that this state produces anxi­
ety which in turn affects the locus and capacity of attention 
in a differential manner across subjects (e.g., Geller &
Shaver, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977). Other research implies
that individual differences in self-esteem and defensive 
subjective style may account for differences in responses to 
engaging in objective self-awareness (Federoff & Harvey, 1976; 
Vallacher & Solodsky , 19 79 ; Wicklund, 1974). Mischel, 
ebbeson, and Zeiss (1973) report that "sensitizers" (on the 
Repression-Sensitizat ion Scale) are more likely to attend to 
their liabilities and "repressors" are more likely to attend 
to their assets. Given success experiences both groups attend­
ed more to personal attributes; given failure experiences, 
repressors did not attend to personal attributes as readily 
as sensitizers, although both groups attended less. The re­
sults of the present study also suggest that persons at either 
extreme of the R-S scale, particularly the repression end, are 
less empathic and less typically self-aware, but these results 
were neither clear-cut or conclusive. In his research review 
on the defense mechanism repression, Holms (1974) reports that 
differences in attention explain mos t of the replicable find­
ings. However, since attention is not only an ability, but 
also subject to motivation, the question as to whether objec­
tive self-awareness is mediated by attention or subjective, 
defensive style may not be of a simple either/or nature.
Further research is clearly indicated in this area of indivi-
i
dual differences and the influence of cognitive, attentional, 
and defensive styles.
The results of this study and previous research clearly 
indicate individual differences not only in reactions to ob­
jective self-awareness, but also in the degree to which indi—
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viduals more spontaneously and characteristically experience 
objective self-awareness without the catalyst of external or 
experimental manipulations. Most importantly, this study 
shows that objective self-awareness not only increases self- 
report validity, hut provides a ndw and valuable technique for 
the investigation of individual differences.
Conclus ions
The result of this study suggests a strong relationship 
between empathy and objective self-awareness. Persons with 
high-empathy also appear to be more self-aware and more aware 
of others and their views than low-empathy persons. Their 
characteristic levels of awareness render the effects of the 
OSA manipulations relatively redundant and insignificant com­
pared to the significant shifts experienced by low-empathy 
persons in descriptions of the real-self and social-self.
Empathy and objective self-awareness appear to be experi­
ences that are concomittantly characteristic of individuals 
to varying degrees. Both appear to have cognitive and motiva­
tional-emotional components that are similar. Both depend on 
the ability to take the role of another that may be related 
to theory and research in social comparison and .social perspec­
tive taking. Both increase sensitivity to one's own internal 
state and evaluations as well as the views and reactions of 
others. Both involve transcending subjective distortions 
due to attention or defensive styles in order to experience 
oneself and others with greater validity and acceptance.
In addition this study indicates that this new technique 
of using objective self-awareness catalysts and manipulations
may be a most valuable research tool in the investigation of 
individual differences. We now have both a new technique and 
evidence that the 111-Thou" relationship occurs in an intersc 
active fashion both intrapsychically and interpersonally, thus 
extending the important implications of the ancient advice, 
"Man, Know Thyself."
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APPENDIX A,
INFORMATION SHEEE AlpX SELIT DESCRIPTION FORMS-
Please answer the following auestionnaires in the* order in which they 
they are' given-. Indicate your age-, and sex below, but, do not give your name.
AGE: . . SEE:;
Please give a code number which can-be used to match these: questionnaires' 
with later measures— Construct your’ code- number in this manner: 
the numbers indicating' the month.,. day, and year of your birth - the number of. 
your brothers ~  the.number o£? your sisters.. For example, if you were- born: 
on-March-3, 1959, have one brother and no sisters, then your code number 
would be- 3 3 59 - 1 —  0. .
birthday
mo day yr // brothers sisters'. 
Code number: ■ ■
FOLD, CREASE, ANE TEAR ALONG THIS' LINE
Please fill in the following information and turn in this half of the 
sheet separately to the experimenter.,, This is to insure proper payment..
NAME:
S 0R0RITY/FRATERNITY:
"I am aware of the nature of this study of interpersonal perception and 
personal style and consent te-participate. I understand that my name will 
not be traceable to my responses and that even the code number I have 
constructed will be transformed., I reserve the right to withdraw from’ 
participating in the study at any time."
'SIGNATURE:
Circle one of the five numbers after each of the following descriptive words
to represent how well each one describes you. Try to describe yourself as you
really are not necessarily as you would like to be.
Ho
anxious 1 2 3 4
Yes
5
charming 1 2 3 4 5
chearful 1 2 3 4 5
clever 1 2 3 4 5
complicated 1 2 3 4 5
efficient i. 2 3 4 5
emotional 1 2 3 4 5
foolish 1 2 3 4 5
gentle 2 3 4 5
good-looking 2 3 4 5
good-natured 2 3 4 5
handsome 2 3 4 5
idealistic 2 3 4 5,
impulsive 2 3 4 5
indifferent 2 3 4 5
individualistic 2 3 4 5
indust rious 2 3 4 5
insightful 2 3 4 5
irresponsible 2 3 4 5
kind 2 3 4 5
lacy 2 3 4 5
loud 2 3 4 5
moody 2 3 4 5
nervous 2 3 4 5
obnoxious 2 3 4 5
organized 2 3 4 5
outgoing 2 3 4 5
pleasant 2 3 4 5
polished 2 3 4 5
Mo Yes
practical 2 3 4 5
precise 2 3 4 5
quiet 2 3 4 5
reckless 2 3 4 5
reflective 2 3 4 5
reserved 2 3 4 5
rude 2 3 4 5
sexy 2 3 4 5
shallow 2 3 4 5
sharp-witted 2 3 4 5
shy 2 3 4 5
silent 2 3 4 5
soft-hearted 2 3 4 5
sophisticated 2 3 4 5
spontaneous 2 3 4 5
stable 2 3 4 5
steady 2 3 4 5
sympathetic 2 3 4 5
talkative 2 3 4 5
t emperament al 2 3 4 5
tense 2 3 4 5
thorough 2 3 4 5
timid 2 3 4 5
touchy 2 3 4 5
unconventional 2 3 4 5
warm 2 3 4 5
wise 2 3 4 5
worrying 2 3 4 5
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Circle one of the five numbers after each of the following words to represent
how descriptive you would like each one to be of you. Describe yourself as you
would like to be-—  not necessarily as you really are.
No Yes No Yes
anxious 1 2 3 4 5 p ractical 1 2 3 4 5
charming 1 2 3 4 5 precise 1 2 3 4 5
cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 quiet 1 2 3 4 5
clever 1 2 3 4 5 reckless 1 2 3 4 5
complicated 1 2 3 4 5 reflective 1 2 3 4 5
efficient 1 2 3 4 5 reserved 1 2 3 4 5
emotional 1 2 3 4 5 rude 1 2 3 4 5
foolish 1 2 3 4 5 sexy 1 2 3 4 5
gentle 1 2 3 4 5 shallow 1. 2 3 4 5
good-looking 1 2 3 4 5 sharp-witted 1 2 3 4 5
good-natured 1 2 3 4 5 shy 1 2 3 4 5
handsome 1 2 3 4 5 silent 1 2 3 4 5
idealistic 1 2 3 4 5 soft-hearted 1 2 3 4 5
ircpuls ive 1 2 3 4 5 sophisticated 1 2 3 4 5
indifferent 1 2 3 4 5 spontaneous 1 2 3 4 5
ind iv idualist ic 1 2 3 4 5 stable 1 2 3 4 5
industrious 1 2 3 4 5 steady 1 2 3 4 5
insightful 1 2 3 4 5 sympathetic 1 2 3 4 5
irrespons ible 1 2 3 4 5 talkative 1 2 3 4 5
kind 1 2 3 4 5 t emperamental 1 2 3 4 5
lazy 1 2 3 4 5 tense 1 2 3 4 5
loud 1 2 3 4 5 thorough 1 2 3 4 5
moody 1 2 3 4 5 timid 1 2 3 4 5
nervous 1 2 3 4 5 touchy 1 2 3 4 5
obnoxious 1 2 3 4 5 unconventional 1 2 3 4 5
organized 1 2 3 4 5 warm 1 2 3 4 5
outgoing 1 2 3 4 5 wise 1 2 3 4 5
pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 worrying 1 2 3 4 5
polished 1 2 3 4 5
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Circle one of the five numbers after each of the following descriptive words
to represent how well each one describes you as others see you. Describe yourself
as others think you are-— not necessarily as you really are.
No
anxious 1 2 3 4
Yes
5
charming 1 2 3 4 5
cheerful 1 2 3 4 5
clever 1 2 3 4 5
complicated 1 2 3 4 5
efficient 1 2 3 4 5
emotional 1 2 3 4 5
foolish 1 2 3 4 5
gentle 1 2 3 4 5
good-looking 1 2 3 4 5
good-natured 1 2 3 4 5
handsome 1 2 3 4 5
idealistic 1 2 3 4 5
impuls ive 1 2 3 4 5
indifferent 1 2 3 4 5
individualistic 1 2 3 4 5
industrious 1 2 3 4 5
insightful 1 2 3 4 5
irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5
kind 1 2 3 4 5
lazy 1 2 3 4 5
loud 1 2 3 4 5
moody 1 2 3 4 5
nervous 1 2 3 4 5
obnoxious 1 2 3 4 5
organized 1 2 3 4 5
outgoing 1 2 3 4 5
pleasant 1 2 3 4 5
polished 1 2 3 4 5
No
pract ical 1 2 3 4
Yes
5
precise 1 2 3 4 5
quiet 1 2 3 4 5
reckless 1 2 3 4 5
reflective 1 2 3 4 5
reserved 1 2 3 4 5
rude 1 2 3 4 3
sexy 1 2 3 4 5
shallow 1 2 3 4 5
sharp-witted 1 2 3 4 5
shy 1 2 3 4 5
silent 1 2 3 4 5
soft-hearted 1 2 3 4 5
sophisticated 1 2 3 4 5
spontaneous 1 2 3 4 5
stable 1 2 3 4 5
steady 1 2 3 4 5
sympathetic 1 2 3 4 5
talkative 1 2 3 4 5
temperamental 1 2 3 4 5
tense 1 2 3 4 5
thorough 1 2 3 4- 5
timid 1 2 3 4 5
touchy 1 2 3 4 5
unconventional 1 2 3 4 5
warm 1 2 3 4 5
wise 1 2 3 4 5
worrying 1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX B 
PEER DESCRIPTIONS
Your task is to describe e&c.b of the persons listed below using r.he 
attached adjective scales,. Consider each person honestly and openly as 
he/she actually is in general-— not just in relatloTishlo to you* Circle 
tire appropriate number Indicating how cbax act eristic or uno.har acteris tic 
each descriptive adjective Is of that person.
Perhaps you know some of. the people better than nthevs and have more 
of a basis on- which to -maRe. a rating,, ttsinp the numbered «caie at the 
bottom of this page., place the appropriate number next to each person's 
name in "the space provided*
SCALE prt
PERSON # .1 : _____ ,_______________      •____  ______________
PERSON if 2 : _  „___________      _
PERSON ft 3 : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
PERSON P h i
.  .  ■. o o X a e* c* *■
ONLY ivNCN 
m  FACE 
OR NAME
> i , - » »  a «> o , -i .
slichtly
ACQUAINTED
RELATIVELY
WELL-
ACQUAINTED
• . . ^ f , 
FRIEND CLOSE
erikth
Your Coda Number:
7W.
Circle one of the five numbers after each of the following descriptive words 
to represent how well each one describes Person X. Try to describe Person X as 
he/she really is— not necessarily as he/she would like to be.
No Yes Mo Yes
anxious 1 2 3 4 5 practical 1 2 3 4 5
charming 1 2 3 4 5 precise 1 2 3 4 5
cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 quiet 1 2 3 4 5
clever 1 2 3 4 5 reckless 1 2 3 4 5
complicated 1 2 3 4 5 reflective 1 2 3 4 5
efficient 1 2 3 4 5 reserved 1 2 3 4 5
emotional 1 2 3 4 5 rude 1 2 3 4 5
foolish 1 2 3 4 5 sexy 1 2 3 4 5
gentle 1 2.. 3 4 5 shallow 1 2 3 4 5
good-natured 1 2 3 4 5 sharp-witted 1 2 3 4 5
good-looking 1 2 3 4 5 shy 1 2 3 4 5
handsome 1 2 3 4 5 silent 1 2 3 4 5
idealistic 1 2 3 4 5 soft-hearted 1 2 3 4 5
impulsive 1 2 3 4 5 sophisticated 1 2 3 4 5
indifferent 1. 2 3 4 5 spontaneous 1 2 3 4 5
individualistic 1 2 3 4 5 stable 1 2 3 4 5
industrious 1 2 3 4 5 steady 1 2 3 4 5
insightful 1 2 3 4 5 sympathetic 1 2 3 4 5
irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 talkative 1 2 3 4 5
kind 1 2 3 4 5 t emp eramen t al 1 2 3 4 5
lazy 1 2 3 4 5 tense 1 2 3 4 5
loud 1 2 3 4 5 thorough 1 2 3 4 5
moody 1 2 3 4 5 timid 1 2 3 4 5
nervous 1 2 3 4 5 t ouchy 1 2 3 4 5
obnoxious 1 2 3 4 5 .unconventional 1 2 3 4 5
organized 1 2 3 4 5 warm 1
/
2 3 4 5
outgoing 1 2 3 4 5 wise 1 2 3 4 5
pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 worrying 1 2 3 4 5
polished 1 2 3 4 5
APPENDIX C
PEEP RATING OF EMPATHY
Your task is to rate each of the persons listed ’below for empathy,
How well does each person understand the experiences of others? Think ahout 
each person in his/her relationships in general, not jtast in relationship to you
The statements on the following page describe empathy and lack of empathy. 
Although some of the statements may seem like they are asking the same thing,, 
they differ in that some are concerned with sensitivity to the experiences of 
others, some with the attempt to understand others, and some with success in 
communicating understanding, Consider each statement carefully.
Perhaps you know some of the people hotter than others and have more of 
a.basis on which to make a rating, T?ue the scale at the bottom of tha second 
page to indicate how confident you are In your rating of that person. Circle 
the appropriate number (1 -and 7 are the extremes; your answer may he somewhere 
in between).
PERSON h 1
PERSON #
PERSON $ 3
PERSON ?/
Your Code Number:
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Peer Rating of Empathy Person ^ _____
Rater’s Code fl:______________________
Think about the person you named above. In your opinion, hot* emoathic is 
this person in his/her relationships? Pow well does this Person.understand the 
experiences of others? Think, about this person in his/her relationships in 
general, not just in relationship to you.
Consider each statement below and mark it with the number that indicates 
how true or untrue you believe it to be of this person.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NEVER OR USUALLY SOMETI?*ES BUT OCCASIONALLY OFTEN USUALLY ALNAYS OR
ALMOST NEVER NOT INFREOUENTLY TRUE TRUE TRUE ALMOST
TRUE TRUE TRUE ALWAYS TP"
 1. This person tries to see things through other people's eyes.
_____ 2. This person may understand another person's words but not the way he/she feels
_3. This person is willing to tell his/her own thoughts and feelings when sure 
that another person really wants to know them.
_4. This person is more interested in expressing and communicating himself/herself 
than in knowing and understanding another.
_5. This person is interested in knowing what other people's experiences mean 
to them.
_6. Sometimes this person thinks others feel a certain way because he/she feels 
that way.
I . This person understand exactly what other people mean.
_8. This person tells others what he/she thinks about them, whether they want to
know it or not.
9. This person can be deeply and fully aware of other people's innermost feeling*
10. This person understands what others say from a detached, distant point of view
II. This person is friendly and warm toward other people.
12. This person is not always honest with himself/her3elf about the way he/she
feels toward another person.
13. This person gives others the feeling of being understood.
14. This person's own attitudes toward what others say, or do, stop him/her
from really understanding them.
15. This person appreciates what other people's experiences feel like to them.
16. Depending on his/her mood, this person sometimes responds to others with
warmth and interest, and at other times with indifference or annoyance.
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1 2  3 4 5 6 7
NEVE?. OR USUALLY SO’tF7,I?fFS BUT OCCASIONALLY' OFTEN USUALLY ALWAYS OR 
ALMOST NEVER 'TOT INFFEOTJENTLY TRUE TRUE TRITE ALMOST
TRUE TRUE TRUE ALWAYS TR.UE
_____ 17. This person genuinely carps about others.
_.1R, This nerson does rot realize how strongly others feel about so me of the 
things they discuss.
_19. This nerson expresses positive interest and concern for others.
_20. This person * s outward resoonse may be suite different from his inner 
reaction to others.
_21. This person is honest and genuine with others.
_27. This person's general feeling toward another- nerson may vary considerably.
_23. Tliis person understands all of what others say to him/her.
?.k. This person is impatient with others.
25. If someone had a Problem, this T7ould he a pood person with whom he/she
could tall* and be shown understanding.
_2S. This person may nlay a role with others or respond to them mechanically.
27. Tjh.sn others do rot say what they mean at all clearly, this person still 
understands them.
_2B. This person avoids telling others anything that might unset them.
_29. This person can be deeply and fully aware of other recoin1s most painful
feelinys without heipy burdened by them or taking them on himself/herself.
39. This person may jump to the conclusion that others feel more strongly or 
more concerned about something- than they actually do.
_31. If this person must tell another person something upsetting, he/she does so 
in a tactful, understanding manner.
32. This person tries to understand others, from his/her. own point of view 
(rather than from their points of view).
33*-This person does not try to manipulate others for his/her own.interests.
34. This person reacts to others in a somewhat'guarded, uncomfortable manner.
35. This person is helpful to other people in their times of stress.
36. This person is not easy for someone to get to know.
I know this person so little I know this person well
that I am not at all confident 1...2...3...4...5...6...7 enough to be. very confident 
in my empathy rating. in my empathy rating.
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APPENDIX D
AFFECTIVE SENSITIVITY SCALE 
Instructions
You will be viewing short scenes of actual counseling sessions. Most of the 
clients are Midwestern high school stude.nts who have come to a university coun­
seling center, where the counselors are in training.
Your task is to identify what feelings the clients have toward themselves and 
toward the counselors they are working with. Although in any one scene a client 
may have a variety of feelings, concentrate on identifying his/her last feelings 
in the scene.
Most scenes have two multiple choice items to a n s w e r —  a first item about how
the client is feeling about himself/herself, and a second item about how the
client is feeling toward the counselor. After you view a scene, read each item 
for that scene and ask yourself the following question:
If the client were to view this same scene, and if he/she
were completely open and honest, (i.e. if he/she were in a
safe environment where he/she could express his/her real 
feelings), which of these three responses would he/she 
use to describe his/her feelings?
When the videotape was made, the client viewed the scene with another, more 
experienced counselor and discussed how he/she had been feeling during the 
scene. One of the multiple choice statements is the client's description of 
how he/she had been feeling.
_ ______ __________  Here is a sample item:________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Client I 
Scene 1
Item 1
1. This exploring of my feelings is good. It makes me feel good.
2. I feel very sad and unhappy.
3. I'm groping and confused; I can't bring it all together.
After viewing Scene 1 for Client 1, you would read these three statements and 
decide which one best states what the client said about his/her own feelings 
after viewing the same scene. Then you would do the same for the remaining item(s) 
for scene 1. Although most scenes have two items to answer, a few scenes have 
one or three items.
Please answer all the items. There will be thirty seconds to answer each of the 
first eleven items. For the remaining items there will be twenty seconds for 
each i tern.
Give your full attention to the scene when it is shown and read the items only 
when it is over. Remember to concentrate on the latter part of each scene in 
determining the most accurate description of the client's feelings.
On the videotape, there is a split screen with the client on the left and the 
counselor on the right. During the counseling session the client and counselor 
were actually facing each other.
AFFECTIVE SENSITIVITY SCALE
CLIENT I 
Scene 1
Item 1
1. I'm pleased, happy; r  feel good all over!
2. It was brought right back; that amazes me, but
it hits quite bad too. It hurts.
3. I’m not bothered by this. I can handle it. I'm
confident.
Item 2
1. He's (counselor) caught me: careful, I'm not sure 
I want that.
2. I like him. He's trying to make the situation 
a little lighter and made me feel better.
3. I don't feel he understands. He's sarcastic.
I don't like that.
CLIENT I 
Scene 2
Item 3
1. I feel a little uneasy and self-conscious, but 
not much.
2. This scares me. I feel frightened!
3. I feel flirtatious. I like this!
Item 4
1. I feel a little bit embarrassed,, but that's all 
right as long as I can keep my composure.
2. I have a feeling of sadness.
3. I feel flustered and embarrassed.
Item 5
1. He's asking for some touchy material, but that's 
all right. It's about time he knew.
2. He's being very frank and open! I'm not sure I 
want that.
3. I want him to leave me alone— I want out of here. 
I don't like this.
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CLIENT I
Scene 3
Item 6
1. I'm getting; so much attention. I really enjoy this.
It makes me feel good.
2. I'm scared by what I'm feeling. I feel embarrassed 
and threatened.
3. I have the feeling that what I wanted was wrong, and 
I'm a little ashamed of myself.
Item 7
1. This is good. We're really moving into my feelings.
2. He's too perceptive; he's looking right through me.
3. He's getting a little sticky; I'm not sure I like that.
CLIENT II
Scene 1
Item 8
1. I feel protective and defensive of what people may
think about my family.
2. All this seems so pointless! I'm puzzled and
bored.
3. We're having a nice conversation. Some of these
things really make me think.
Item 9
1. This guy (counselor) embarrasses me with the questions
he asks.
2. The questions he asks really make me think,
I'm not sure I Tike that.
3. I can't follow this guys's line of thought.
What's he trying to do?
CLIENT III
Scene 1
Item 10
1. I'm concerned about my physical condition. I'm
worried about it.
2. I want pity. I want her to think, "oh, you poor
boy".
3. I feel good— nothing's bothering me, but I enjoy
talking.
Item 11
1. She's too young to be counseling, and she's a
girl. I'm not sure I like this.
2. She likes me; I know she does.
3. I'd like her to think I'm great.
81.
CLIENT 11 I
Scene'2
CLIENT i 
Scene 3
Item 12
~  P"m a little annoyed with my fami iy's ambitions 
for me.
2. That's a he I I of a lotto ask I It makes me mad!
3. I feel sorry for myself, and I want others to feel 
the same.
I tern 13
1. She (counselor) really understands me! She's 
with me now.
2. I don't feel much either way towards the counselor; 
she's not important to me.
3. I wonder if she appreciates the pressure that's put 
on me?
Item 14
1. This whole thing just makes me feel sad and unhappy.
2. It kind of angers me that they don't appreciate me,
when I feel 1 did my best. I wish I could tell them off.
3. No matter how well I do, I'm always criticized, it doesn't
bother me too much though, because I know that I did my best.
1tem I 5
1. I can tell that she understands what I'm saying. She's 
reaIly with me.
2. I wish I could get out of here; I don't like her.
3. Understand what I’m saying; I want her to know how i feel
CLIENT III 
Scene 4
item
1. I really want to be successful, and somehow I know 
that I can be.
2. That makes me feel kind of sad, unhappy. I don't 
want to believe that it's true— I want to be good.
3. I don't know what I feel here. It's all very confusing.
Item 17
1. I feel neutral towards her here. I'm not paying 
any attention to her.
2. Please feel sorry for me and try to help me. I 
wish she would praise me.
3. I like talking to her. She can be trusted even to the 
point of telling her how I really feel about myself.
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CLIENT IV
Scene I
Item 18
I. I feel rejected and empty inside. Am I iovable?
2- I feei a little lonely. I want my bey friend to
pay a little more attention to me.
3. 1 really don't feel much here; I'm just kind of talking
to f i I ! up space..
Item 19
1. Please say it isn’t fair, Mr. Counselor.
2. He reaIly understands me. I can tell him anything.
3. I'm not sure I care what he says. It's kind of unimportant
to me what he feels about me at this time.
CLIENT IV 
Scene 2
Item 20
T~. I *m afraid of marriage— insecure; it might not work out,
and-I'd be Iost.
2. I really can give him all the affection he needs; I feel
I'm a worthwhile person to be desired. He wouldn't dare
step out on me.
3. I'm realiy not too worried; it'd a I I work out in the end 
even if we have to go to a marriage counselor.
Item 2 I
1. I don't care if he (counselor) can help me or not.
I'm not sure I want his help,
2. He's so sympathetic. That makes me feel good.
3. Can you help me?
CLIENT IV 
Scene 3
Item 22
1. I feel. I have some need to be liked, but it's not real strong.
2. I'm not loveable; I don't really like myself.
3. I'm a good person; I'm loveable. Down deep I know i am.
Item 23
1. I feei dejected, kind of insecure. I want to be likeable!
2. My main concern is that it's hard for me to take criticism.
I usually think of myself as perfect.
3. I feel a little sad about all this; I do kind of want
people to Ii ke me.
Item 24
1. He thinks we I I of me; I know he does, I can tell.
2. I want the counselor to really like me, but I'm
not sure he does.
3. I like it when he asks questions like that. They make me
really think about deeoer thinas.
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CLIENT IV
Scene 4
Item 25
1. I wouldn't want to be treated like he treats Mother, 
but I don’t mind him (stepfather) too much..
2. I feel very little emotion about anything at this point.
3. I hate him (stepfather)'.
Item 26
1. Boy, I'm happy that he (counselor) agrees with me.
He sympathizes with me. I feel completely accepted.
2. I'm embarrassed to tell the counselor how strong my 
feelings really are.
3. I'm not sure he'll be able to help me much after all 
I'll just have to work this out by myself.
CLIENT IV 
Scene 5
Item 27
1. I'm kind of feeling sorry for myself, but I'm not
really too worried.
2. I want to move out of the house as soon as possible.
1 feel I would be better off on my own.
3. My own parents don't want me; I feel cut off and hurt.
Item 28
CLIENT V 
Scene I
I don't feel he's (counselor) helpful at all, and if he can't 
help me and see my side, I'm not going to like him either-. 
He's got me in a spot, but I feel I can still get him 
to see me as a good girl who is persecuted.
I wish the counselor were my father. He's listening; 
he understands how I feel;
item 29
1. Disapprove'. She'd kill me!
2. I feel jovial; this is real interesting.
3. I'm not sure how she would feel but the whole idea 
of her finding out excites me.
Item 30
1. He (counselor) understands me completely. He certainly 
is relaxed and comfortable.
2. I really don't care what he feels about me. I just 
want someone to talk to— anyone will do.
3. I was wondering how he sou Id fee! about me and what 
I'm say i ng.
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CLIENT V
Scene 2
Item 3 I
1. I think my brother is O.K. We have fun together.
2. I don't know what I'm saying here. I’m 3 little 
mixed up and confused.
3. I'm saying something that's important to me. I like Doug.
CLIENT V 
Scene 3
Item 32
1. This is very confusing for me. I'm not sure I understand
what is goi ng on.
2. This is how I really feel, I'm kind of starting to be myself.
3. I'm just talking to be talking here; this really doesn't 
mean much to me.
Item 33.
1. I guess he's (counselor) all right, but I'm still
not sure he understands me.
2. Let's get going. i'm impatient'. I want to move to
more important matters.
3. I feel comfortable with him. He understands me.
CLIENT V 
Scene 4
Item 34
1. I love my brother, but not romantically. We just
have a good brother-sister relationship.
2. I don't know about feeling this way about Doug; 
it feels so good, but it concerns me too.
3. I feel better about my relationship with Doug now. It helps
to get i t out i n the open. Now I fee I i t's a II r i ght.
CLIENT V 
Scene 5
Item 35
1. I'm not feeling much of anything here. I'm just kind
of talking to be talking.
2. I’m mad at everyone at this point and don't know which
way to turn; I guess I'm mad at myself too.
3. iNow I’m talking about things that are real. I'm not
on stage anymore. She is a louse!
Item 36
1. He (counselor) feels she's a bad person too. I'can 
tell; he agrees with me.
2. Don’t you agree with me? I want to know what you think.
3. He thinks this all sounds petty. He doesn't understand.
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CLIENT VI
Scene I
Item 37
1. I felt angry with my mother, but this made me feel 
guilty. I needed to make an excuse for her.
2. I'nr really not angry with mother. It's jnot her fault.
3. I'm in a very passive mood. I'm just relaxing and 
talking about things that interest me.
Item 38
1. This counselor is all right. I feel I can confide 
in him.
2. I feei uncomfortable. I'm not sure what this 
counselor wants me to do.
3. I feel he wants me to talk about myself, but I don't care.
I'm going to talk about what I want to talk about.
CLIENT VI 
Scene 2
Item 39
1. I'm very sensitive; I'm very easily hurt.
2. I'm somewhat sensitive and easily hurt, but not deeply so.
3. I'm not sensitive or easily hurt at ail. 1 just like 
to make, peop I e th.i nk I am.
Item 40
1. That makes me mad, I can do it— I know I can, but 
things just keep getting in my way.
2. It's really all his fault, if he just wouldn't have 
been such a joker.
3. This makes me feel fuiity; I need to blame someone 
else instead of bI aming myself.
Item 4 1
1. I'm neutral towards the counselor. I don't care what 
he feels about me.
2. I’m afraid he doesn't like me and what I'm saying 
about myself. I don't want him to be harsh with me.
3. He's easy to talk to. He understands what I'm like, 
and he still likes me. I can confide in him.
CLIENT VI I 
Scene I
Item 42
1. Say, this is all right. I like this.
2. I'm not feeling anything deeply. I know what I need!
3. It's embarrassing and difficult. I feel a little annoyed.
Item 43
1. I feel I can rely on this guy, so I'I I let him talk 
and I'll just answer his questions.
2. I wonder what you think about this— please respond.
Give me some help!
3. The counselor is a good guy. I like his questions; 
they make it easier for me.
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CLIENT VI I
Scene 2
Item 44
1. I feel very unhappy about what I may eventually have 
to do.
2. I don't know what I feel; I'm confused about what I
fee I.
3. I'm damned uncomfortable; it's so confusing. I feel
kind of 'blah' about it all.
item 45
1. He's (counselor) missing the point. He bugs me.
2. I can't really tell about this guy. I don't know
how I feel about him.
3. He seems like a good guy. He asks nice questions.
! I i ke him.
CLIENT VIII 
Scene I
Item 46
1. I'm not sure how I feel about this counselor. I don't 
feel one way or the other about him.
2. I like the counselor very much— he makes me feel good.
3. He understands me pretty well and is trying to help.
I guess I kind of like him.
CLIENT VIII 
Scene 2
Item 47
1. Goody-goody people don't really know any better, so I 
can't be too disgusted with them, but it does make me angry.
2. I don't really mind people feeling superior to me.
It just makes me a Iittle angry.
3. It tears me up inside when people think they're better 
than I am. I want people to be the same as me.
Item 48
1. I'm every bit as good as they are. I really feel 
I am. I know I am.
2. I kind of wished they liked me, but I can live without 
being a member of their group.
3. Those smart kids make me feel stupid.
Item 49
1. I feel sorry for them; they just don't realize what 
they're doing to people like me.
2. I feel I'm not as good as they are, and it really 
hurts when people act that way.
3. It makes me a Iittle angry. I'm every bit as good 
as they are.
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CLIENT VIII
Scene 3
Item 50
1. I feel a little insignificant, and this makes me a little unhappy
2. I'm a nobody. I'm always left out.
3. I'm unhappy with school. That’s what is really bothering m9.
Item 5 i
1. He (counselor) doesn^t quite understand, but I 
don't care. It doesn't matter.
2. I don’t feel one way or the other towards this 
counselor, we’re just having a nice talk.
3. He (counselor) is really listening tome, and I 
feel he understands what I'm feeling.
CLIENT IX 
Scene I
Item 52
1. I'm feeling scared, concerned. Is this forme?
2. I just feel uncertain about what to talk about.
If once I get started, I'll be a I I right.
3. I feei very deeply depressed.
Item 53
1. He (counselor) seems to be listening— can he understand 
how I feel?
2. He's really with me. I can tell he understands me.
3. He doesn't keep things moving enough. I don't like that.
CLIENT IX 
Scene 2
Item 54
1. I'd like to think I could make it, but I'm not 
sure. I feel inadequate.
2. I just have an l-don’t-care feeling; that's my real 
attitude towards all of this.
3. I'm confused here. I really don't have any definite feelings.
Item 55
1. I want to impress the counselor. I want him 
to be Iieve I can do it.
2. He believes me; he thinks I can do it; I can 
te I I.
3. I really don't care what the counselor thinks.
It's not important to me.
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CLIENT IX
Scene 3
Item 56
1. What's the use of looking ahead? I’m scared to think about It.
2. I can accept my situation. Really, things aren't so bad. 
Things may bother me a little, but really not much.
3. I enjoy just living for today.
item 57
1. He's (counselor) all right. He really understands me.
2. Nobody can reaI Iy understand this. 1 don't think
he wiI I be any different.
3. I don't care what he thinks or feels; he's not
important to me anyway.
CLIENT IX 
Scene 4
Item 53
!. I feel somewhat unhappy. I don't like to feel this way.
2. There's something about me; I just don't fit in, and 
that makes me. feel real inadequate.
3. In some instances, I'm unsure of myself. I'm afraid I'll do 
the wrong thing, but I can handle this just by avoiding 
these situations.
CLIENT X 
Scene I
Item 59
1. I'm unhappy about all this, but I'm afraid to make a change.
2. It's not that I don't like school, it's just that I want 
to do the things I like most-.
3. I'm not the student type. School bores me, but it 
embarrasses me when I say it.
Item 60
!. The counselor is a nice guy. I like him, and I think 
he Ii kes me.
2. I wonder what the sounselor thinks of me. He'll 
probably think less of me for saying this.
3. I don't care what he thinks of me. It doesn't realiy matter 
to me.
CLIENT X 
Scene 2
Item 6 I
1. I've found some new dimensions. I I Ike to feel that I can
have some excitement, but this kind of scares me too.
2. This doesn't really mean much. I'm not feeling much
of anything.
3. This makes me feel very guilty; I'm very ashamed.
Item 62
1. I suppose he'll (counselor) tell me that's wrong, too.
I'm not sure he understands me very well.
2. He's O.K.; he's listening to what I have to say.
He really understands me and my feelings.
3. I don't care what he thinks or feels; it's not important.
I don.'t have any feelings towards the counselor.
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APPENDIX £
CPI EMPATHY SCALE
Please mark each of the following statements jT if it is true for you or F_ if it 
is false for you. Do not leave any statements unanswered.
1. A person needs to "show off* a. little 
now and then.
2. I liked "Alice in Wonderland" by 
Lewis Carroll.
3. Clever, sarcastic people make me 
feel very uncomfortable.
4. I usually take an active part in 
the entertainment at parties.
5. I feel sure that there is only 
one true religion.
6. I am afraid of deep water.
7. 1 must admit I often try to get 
my own way regardless of what 
others may want.
8. I have at one time or another in 
my life tried my hand at writing 
poetry.
18. I like to talk before groups- of peo-
19. When a man is with a woman he is- 
usually thinking about things relat: 
to her sex.
20. Only a fool would try to change our 
American way of life.
21. My parents were always very strict 
and stern with me.
22. Sometimes I rather enjoy going 
against the rules and doing things 
I'm not supposed to.
23. I think I would like to belong to 
a singing club.
24. I think I am usually a leader in 
my group.
25. I like to have a place for everythin 
and everything in its place.
9. Most of the arguments or quarrels 
I get into are over matters of 
principle.
10. I would like the job of a foreign 
correspondent for a newspaper.
11. People today have forgotten how to 
feel properly ashamed of themselves.
12. I prefer a shower to a bathtub.
13. I always try to consider the other 
fellow's feelings before I do some­
thing .
14. I usually don't like to talk much 
unless I am with people I know very 
well.
15. I can remember "nlaying sick" to 
get out of something.
16. I like to keep people guessing what 
I'm going to do next.
17. Before I do something I try to con­
sider how my friends will react to it.
_26. I don't like to work on a problem 
unless there is the nossibilitv of 
coming out with a clear-cut and 
unambiguous answer.
27. It bothers me when something unexpec 
interrupts my daily routine..
23. I have a natural talent for influenc 
people.
29. I really don't care whether peoole 
like me or dislike me.
30. The trouble with many people is that 
they don’t take things seriously 
enough.
31. It is hard for me just to sit still 
and relax.
32. Once in a while I think of things 
too bad to talk about.
33. I feel that it is certainly best to 
keep my mouth shut when I'm in troub!
34. I am a good mixer.
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34. I am an important person.
_35. I like poetry.
_36. My feelings are not easily hurt.
_37. I have met problems so full of possi­
bilities that I have been unable to 
make up my mind about them.
_38. Often I can’t understand why I have 
been so cross and grouchy.
39. What others think of me does not 
bother me.
_40. I would like to be a journalist.
_41. I like to talk about sex.
42. My. way of doing things is. apt to be 
misunderstood by others.
43. Sometimes without any reason or even 
when things are going wrong I feel 
excitedly happy,"on top of the world."
44. I like to be with a crowd who play 
jokes on one another.
45. My mother or father often made me 
obey even when I thought it was 
unreasonable.
46. I' easily become impatient with people.
47. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons 
I love.
48. I tend to be interested in several 
different hobbies rather than to 
stick to one of them for a long time.
52. I would certainly enjoy beating a 
crook at his own game.
_53. I am often so annoyed when someone 
tries to get ahead of me in a line t 
people that I speak to him about it
54. I used to like hopscotch.
55. I have never been made especially 
nervous over trouble that any membe? 
of my family have gotten into.
56. As a rule I have little difficulty 
"putting myself 5.nto other people’s 
shoes."
57. I have seen some things so sad that 
I almost felt like crying.
58. Disobedience to the government is 
never justified.
59. It is the duty of a citizen to suppc 
his country, right or wrong.
60. I am usually rather short-tempered 
with people who come around and both 
me with foolish auestions.
61. I have a pretty clear idea of what
I would try to impart to my students 
if I were a teacher.
62. I enjoy the company of strong-willed 
people.
63. I frequently undertake more than 
I can accomplish.
49. I am not easily angered.
50. People have often misunderstood my 
intentions when I was trying to put 
them right and be helpful.
51. I am usually calm and not easily 
upset.
APPENDIX F 
ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE
For each of the following statements! please indicate whether you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
1. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
 Strongly agree / __Agree / ___Disagree /  Strongly disagree
2. I feel- that1'1"have a number of good qualities..
 Strongly agree / _ Agree / ___fi&sagree / ____Strongly disagree
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
 Strongly agree / Agree / ___Disagree /  Strongly disagree
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
 Strongly agree / Agree /  Disagree /  Strongly disagree
5- I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
 Strongly agree / Agree / Disagree / ____Strongly disagree
6. I take a positive attitude toward nyself.
 Strongly agree /  Agree / Disagree /  Strongly disagree
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
 Strongly agree / Agree / Disagree /  Strongly disagree
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
 Strongly agree / __Agree / Disagree /  Strongly disagree
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
_Strongly agree / Agree / Disagree /  Strongly disagree
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
 Strongly agree / Agree /  Disagree /  Strongly disagree
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APPENDIX G 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE
Please answer the following questions by placing the appropriate letter 
(see key below) before each statement to indicate how characteristic of you each 
statement is. Do not be concerned about consistency; just arespond as accurately 
as you can.
A =• EXTREMELY CHARACTERISTIC 
J3 => CHARACTERISTIC 
C = NEUTRAL 
D = UNCHARACTERISTIC 
E = EXTREMELY UNCHARACTERISTIC
 1. I'm alwa3/s trying to figure myself out.
2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.
 3. Cenerally, I'm not very aware of myself.
 A. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.
 5. I reflect about myself av lot.
 _6. I'm concerned about the way I present myself.
 7. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
 8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me.
 9. I never scrutinize myself.
 10. I get embarrassed very easily.
11. I'm self-conscious about the way I look.
 12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.
 13. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings.
 14. I usually worry about making a good impression.
 15. I'm constantly examining my motives..
 16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group.
 17. One of the last things I do before T leave my house is look in the mirror.
 18. I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself.
 19. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.
 20. I’m alert to changes in my mood.
21. I ’m usually aware of my appearance.
 __22. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem.
 23. Large groups make me nervous.
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